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THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE LIMITS 
OF ANTITRUST 
Thomas A. Lambert* 
Abstract: Numerous commentators have characterized the Roberts Court’s 
antitrust decisions as radical departures that betray a pro-business, anti-
consumer bias. That characterization is inaccurate. Although some of the 
decisions do represent significant changes from past practice, the “pro-
business/anti-consumer” characterization fails to appreciate the funda-
mental limits of antitrust, a body of law that requires judges and juries to 
make fine distinctions between procompetitive and anticompetitive behav-
iors that frequently resemble each other. Although false acquittals of anti-
competitive conduct may harm consumers, so may false convictions of 
procompetitive actions. And efforts to eliminate errors in liability judg-
ments are themselves costly. Optimal antitrust rules will aim to minimize 
the sum of decision costs (the costs of reaching a liability decision) and 
expected error costs (the social losses from false convictions and false ac-
quittals). Each of the Roberts Court’s antitrust decisions can be defended 
in light of this “decision-theoretic” approach, an approach calculated to 
maximize the effectiveness of the antitrust enterprise, to the ultimate ben-
efit of consumers. This Article first describes the fundamental limits of an-
titrust and the decision-theoretic approach such limits inspire. The Article 
then analyzes the Roberts Court’s antitrust decisions, explaining how each 
coheres with the decision-theoretic model. Finally, the Article predicts how 
the Court will address three issues likely to come before it in the future: ty-
ing, loyalty rebates, and bundled discounts. 
Introduction 
 One often hears two things about the Roberts Court’s treatment of 
antitrust. The first is that this Court has displayed a greater interest in 
antitrust than its direct predecessor.1 That seems accurate. Whereas the 
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1 See Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent U.S. Su-
preme Court Decisions?, Competition Pol’y Int’l, Autumn 2007, 59, 60 (“After a long anti-
trust slumber, the U.S. Supreme Court has become active again in antitrust law, deciding 
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Rehnquist Court showed little enthusiasm for antitrust cases in its later 
years, the Roberts Court issued seven antitrust decisions in its first two 
years alone.2 Some have attributed the trend toward more antitrust cas-
es, and more business cases generally, to Chief Justice Roberts’s years in 
private practice, during which he confronted a number of business and 
antitrust issues.3 Whatever its cause, there does seem to be an uptick in 
enthusiasm for antitrust cases on the current Supreme Court. 
 The second oft-heard observation about the Roberts Court’s anti-
trust decisions is that they betray a significant pro-business (or, pejora-
tively, anti-consumer) shift on the Court. Not surprisingly, left-leaning 
advocacy groups have repeatedly sounded this refrain.4 But even re-
spected academics and leaders of the antitrust bar have construed the 
Roberts Court’s antitrust decisions as being radically and reflexively pro-
business.5 For example, noted legal scholar Erwin Chemerinsky recently 
dubbed the Roberts Court “the most pro-business Supreme Court there 
has been since the mid-1930s” and has characterized the Court’s anti-
trust decisions as “favoring business over consumers.”6 Chemerinsky, by 
                                                                                                                      
 
seven cases in the last two years.”); Joshua D. Wright, The Roberts Court and the Chicago School 
of Antitrust Analysis: The 2006 Term and Beyond, Competition Pol’y Int’l, Autumn 2007, 
24, 25 (“The antitrust activity level of the Roberts Court thus far has exceeded the single 
case average of the Court prior to the 2003–2004 Term by a significant margin.”). 
2 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution 6 
(2005). The Rehnquist Court decided one antitrust case from 1993 to 1995, one each year 
from 1996 through 1999, and none from 2000 to 2003; the Roberts Court decided seven 
cases from 2006 to 2007. See id.; see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 
551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007); Credit Suisse Sec. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 267–68 (2007); Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549 (2007); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hard-
wood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 
28, 31 (2006); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 3 (2006); Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. 
Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 182 (2006). 
3 See David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court? Explaining the Chamber of 
Commerce’s Success at the Roberts Court, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1019, 1055 & n.205 (2009) 
(“Chief Justice Roberts’s near-decade in private practice no doubt attuned him to the in-
terests of the corporate bar.”). 
4 See Alliance for Justice, Unprecedented Injustice: The Political Agenda of 
the Roberts Court 3, available at http://www.afj.org/judicial-selection/unprecedented-
injustice.pdf (construing the Court’s Leegin decision as holding “that manufacturers and 
retailers of consumer goods could engage in price-fixing”). 
5 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, An Overview of the October 2007 Supreme Court Term, 25 
Touro L. Rev. 541, 545 (2009). 
6 Id.; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court: Sharp Turn to the Right, Cal. B.J. (Aug. 
2007), http://archive.calbar.ca.gov/Archive.aspx?month=8&year=2007 (follow hyperlink 
bearing web page title). Chemerinsky highlights three decisions that, he says, favored 
business over consumers. He writes: 
In several cases, the Court made it much more difficult to sue business for an-
titrust violations. In Leegin Creative Leather Products Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., the Court 
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his own admission, is not an antitrust expert.7 The meme he recites has 
nevertheless been embraced by others who do have substantial antitrust 
expertise. For example, William Kolasky, a former Deputy Assistant At-
torney General in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice and an associate editor of the American Bar Association’s Antitrust 
magazine, made the following observations in 2008: 
Our Supreme Court, especially under the leadership of Chief 
Justice John Roberts, seems equally intent on cutting back on 
private enforcement. It has been more than fifteen years since 
the Supreme Court last decided an antitrust case in favor of a 
plaintiff. Over this fifteen-year period, plaintiffs have gone 0-
for-16, with not a single plaintiff winning an antitrust case in 
the Supreme Court since the first George Bush was president. 
This record led Antitrust to ask in its last issue whether the Su-
preme Court’s recent antitrust decisions represent “The End 
of Antitrust as We Know It?”8 
 The central claim of this Article is that the second common asser-
tion about the Roberts Court’s antitrust jurisprudence—that it is pro-
business and anti-consumer and represents a radical departure from 
the past—is wrong and reflects a misunderstanding of the antitrust en-
terprise. As a body of law regulating business conduct for the benefit of 
consumers, antitrust is inherently limited. Once one accounts for the 
limits of antitrust, the rulings of the Roberts Court, rather than “favor-
ing business over consumers,” seem calculated to maximize antitrust’s 
effectiveness to the ultimate benefit of consumers. Specifically, the Rob-
                                                                                                                      
overruled a 96-year-old decision and held that it is not a per se violation of 
antitrust laws for a manufacturer to set minimum resale prices. In Credit Suisse 
Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, the Court ruled that there cannot be antitrust 
claims for securities law violations. The court explained that securities laws 
were “clearly incompatible” with antitrust laws, such that securities law implic-
itly precluded antitrust claims. And in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Court 
held that stating a claim under the Sherman Act’s restraint of trade provision 
requires that the complaint allege sufficient facts to suggest that an agree-
ment was made. The Court rejected notice pleading for such claims, thus 
making it harder for plaintiff to get into court. 
Chemerinsky, supra (citations omitted). 
7 Dale Carpenter, AALS Mid-Year Meeting: The Changing Roberts Court, The Volokh Con-
spiracy ( June 4, 2008, 2:03 PM), http://volokh.com/2008/06/04/aals-mid-year-meeting-
the-changing-roberts-court/ (reporting that Chemerinsky “admitted he ‘know[s] nothing 
about’” antitrust). 
8 William Kolasky, Reinvigorating Antitrust Enforcement in the United States: A Proposal, 22 
Antitrust 85, 86 (2008). 
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erts Court’s antitrust cases embrace a decision-theoretic approach that 
seeks to minimize the sum of the decision and error costs that inevita-
bly result from antitrust adjudication. 
 This Article proceeds as follows: Part I sets forth the limits of anti-
trust and explains how a decision-theoretic approach, in light of these 
inherent limits, ultimately benefits consumers by maximizing the overall 
effectiveness of the antitrust enterprise.9 Part II then discusses the Rob-
erts Court’s antitrust decisions, demonstrating how each coheres with a 
decision-theoretic approach.10 Part III looks to the future and predicts 
how the Roberts Court, harnessing the insights of decision theory, will 
resolve several antitrust issues that are likely to come before it.11 
I. The Limits of Antitrust and the Need for a Decision-
Theoretic Approach 
 When it comes to ensuring that consumers have access to low pric-
es, high quality goods, and product variety, there is no better regulator 
than competition. Antitrust thus aims to ensure that markets remain as 
competitive as possible.12 That does not mean, though, that antitrust 
should be singularly focused on ensuring that markets include large 
numbers of competitors.13 In many markets, output will be higher and 
prices lower if producers are allowed to exploit economies of scale by 
growing quite large—so large that only a handful of producers, operat-
ing at “minimum efficient scale” (the point beyond which an increase in 
output does not reduce per unit costs), are able to supply the entire 
market.14 In such markets, output would be impeded and prices would 
rise if the law broke large, efficient producers into smaller, less efficient 
ones.15 It thus makes sense to adopt an output-focused understanding of 
competition, where markets are deemed more competitive when they 
produce more of what consumers want, and at lower prices, and less 
                                                                                                                      
9 See infra notes 12--40 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 41--324 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 325--376 and accompanying text. 
12 Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 2. 
13 See id. 
14 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition 
and Its Practice 27–29 (3d ed. 2005). 
15 See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 112 (2d ed. 2001) (“[D]econcentration 
might impose heavy costs on society by requiring industries to operate with higher costs 
than before they had been deconcentrated.”). 
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competitive when they produce less, and at higher prices.16 The ulti-
mate objective of antitrust is to maximize competition, so understood. 
                                                                                                                     
 Speaking in the most general of terms, antitrust pursues this over-
arching goal by policing the situations in which competition breaks 
down, most notably monopoly (or monopsony), where there is a single 
seller (or buyer), and collusion, where nominal competitors agree not 
to compete.17 The two primary provisions of the Sherman Act corre-
spond to these two paradigmatic defects in competition.18 Section 1 
aims at collusion, proclaiming that “[e]very contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.”19 Section 2 seeks to prevent 
firms from attaining monopoly power, making it illegal to “monopolize, 
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire . . . to monopolize” 
any market.20 
 From the very beginning, these statutory texts have created prob-
lems for judges. Read literally, section 1 is so broad as to be nonsensical, 
for every executory contract restrains trade; when I promise to sell 
something to you, I “restrain” myself from “trading” that item with an-
other.21 Accordingly, the Court early on interpreted section 1 to forbid 
only unreasonable restraints of trade, requiring lower courts to grapple 
with the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable restraints.22 
Section 2 poses interpretive difficulties because neither the Sherman 
Act nor the common law at the time of the Act’s passage ever defined 
the term “monopolize.”23 The Court eventually ruled that monopoliza-
tion consists of possessing some amount of market power and engaging 
in exclusionary conduct, but many pro-consumer acts (e.g., price cuts 
and product improvements) win business for the actor and thus tend to 
exclude rivals, and neither the Court nor antitrust commentators have 
been able to specify what exactly renders an act “unreasonably” exclu-
 
16 See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 2–5 (describing an output-focused understanding 
of competition). 
17 See Hovenkamp, supra note 14, at 11--19. 
18 15 U.S.C. §§ 1--2 (2006). 
19 Id. § 1. 
20 Id. § 2. 
21 See Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (reasoning that the term 
“restraint of trade” in section 1 cannot possibly refer to any restraint on competition be-
cause “[e]very agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains” and be-
cause “[t]o bind, to restrain, is of their very essence”). 
22 Id. (“The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or 
even destroy competition.”). 
23 See Hovenkamp, supra note 14, at 53. 
876 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:871 
sionary.24 Thus, every time a court confronts an antitrust challenge to a 
novel business practice, it must make a judgment about the overall de-
sirability of the practice at issue (e.g., Does it constitute an “unreason-
able” restraint of trade? Is it “unreasonably” exclusionary?). 
 The enforcement provisions of the antitrust laws ensure that 
courts are routinely called upon to make these sorts of judgments in 
lawsuits by private plaintiffs. The Clayton Act provides that “any person 
who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything 
forbidden in the antitrust laws” may bring a lawsuit in federal court.25 
To account for the fact that many antitrust violations occur in secret 
and thus escape condemnation, the statute seeks to optimize the deter-
rent effect of private enforcement by permitting each successful plain-
tiff to “recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of 
suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”26 What we end up with, 
then, is a body of law that is ultimately aimed at maximizing competi-
tion (understood in terms of market output), is quite general in its lit-
eral proscriptions, becomes “fleshed out” by generalist courts adjudicat-
ing private disputes, and is highly attractive to private plaintiffs seeking 
super-compensatory recoveries. 
 Taken together, these aspects of American antitrust law—all of 
which predate the Roberts Court by decades—render antitrust adjudica-
tion an inherently limited enterprise. In most challenges to novel busi-
ness practices (and the prospect of treble damages guarantees that there 
will be many such challenges), whether liability is appropriate will be 
difficult to determine. Challenges to concerted conduct are frequently 
perplexing because a great many, perhaps most, output-enhancing 
business innovations involve cooperation among independent eco-
                                                                                                                      
24 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570--71 (1966); Thomas A. Lam-
bert, Weyerhaeuser and the Search for Antitrust’s Holy Grail, 2007 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 277, 
299--312 (describing competing attempts to specify a unitary test for identifying instances 
of unreasonably exclusionary conduct). 
25 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). Note that a number of Supreme Court decisions have fore-
closed a literal reading of this right to sue by “any person who shall be injured” by an anti-
trust violation. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 
U.S. 519, 526--29 (1983) (outlining the inquiry required beyond mere “reference to the 
broad language of § 4,” including evaluation of the alleged injury); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 
431 U.S. 720, 746--47 (1977) (explaining that the class of potential enforcers has been 
substantially limited by the indirect purchaser rule); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (explaining the more nuanced injury required in anti-
trust cases). 
26 15 U.S.C. § 15; see Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 66–67 (discussing the theoretical ra-
tionale for treble damages); see also Posner, supra note 15, at 271–73 (acknowledging the 
historical use of treble damages, but critiquing their appropriateness across the board). 
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nomic actors, frequently competitors.27 Challenges to unilateral con-
duct that may enhance market power are often hard to resolve because 
all actions that help a seller win business from its rivals—even pro-
consumer actions like most price cuts—technically “exclude” those ri-
vals.28 Distinguishing output-reducing collusion from output-enhancing 
coordination (in section 1 cases) and unreasonable from reasonable 
exclusionary acts (in section 2 cases) can be exceedingly difficult.29 To 
draw the necessary distinctions, judges and juries usually must weigh 
conflicting testimony from economic experts and reach conclusions on 
a number of complex subsidiary issues, such as the contours of the rele-
vant market, the existence and magnitude of entry barriers, and the 
elasticity of demand and/or supply for the product at issue. 
 Antitrust adjudication is thus exceedingly, and inevitably, costly.30 
Most obviously, there are significant costs involved in simply reaching a 
decision. The parties themselves, with the aid of lawyers and, in most 
cases, economic experts, must gather, process, and present a large 
amount of complex data.31 The fact finder must then deliberate over 
the information presented and reach conclusions on both subsidiary 
issues (e.g., the contours of the relevant market) and the outcome-
determinative question (e.g., whether the challenged trade restraint is 
“unreasonable” because it reduces overall market output).32 Taken to-
gether, these costs constitute the decision costs of an antitrust adjudi-
cation. 
 But those are not the only relevant costs. Given the complexity of 
the issues presented in antitrust cases, mistakes are inevitable, and 
those mistakes will themselves impose costs. On the one hand, when a 
fact finder wrongly acquits an anticompetitive practice, market power is 
created or enhanced, causing loss in the form of allocative inefficiency; 
                                                                                                                      
27 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 4–5 (1984) (ob-
serving that practically all output-enhancing economic activities involve extensive coordi-
nation among independent economic actors, many of whom could be competitors). 
28 See Lambert, supra note 24, at 278–79. 
29 See Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 26 (observing that competitive and exclusionary 
conduct look alike); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 
1696, 1710 (1986) (“[I]t is almost impossible to distinguish exclusion from hard competi-
tion.”). It can also be quite difficult to distinguish concerted from unilateral conduct. See 
Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540--41 (1954); Inter-
state Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 224--27 (1939). And, because the Sherman 
Act itself draws a distinction between such types of conduct and posits different legal tests for 
evaluating the legality of each, the distinction matters. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1--2. 
30 Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 4. 
31 Id. at 4--5. 
32 Id. at 9--14. 
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consumers are injured because output is lower and prices higher than 
they otherwise would be.33 On the other hand, when a fact finder 
wrongly convicts a practice that is, in fact, output-enhancing, the mar-
ket is denied the greater output (and lower prices) that practice would 
have produced, and a productive inefficiency results. Again, consumers 
are injured by reduced output, less product variety and innovation, and 
higher prices. Taken together, the productive inefficiencies spawned by 
false positives (hereinafter “Type I errors”) and the allocative ineffi-
ciencies resulting from false negatives (hereinafter “Type II errors”) 
constitute the error costs of antitrust adjudication. As explained below, 
there are good reasons to believe that the costs of false positives will 
exceed those of false negatives.34 But, for present purposes, the impor-
tant point to see is that antitrust adjudication will inevitably involve 
some mistakes, and those mistakes—be they false acquittals or false 
convictions—will impose social costs.35 
 The decision costs and error costs associated with antitrust adjudi-
cation, costs that are simply unavoidable under our antitrust laws as 
drafted, constitute the limits of antitrust.36 Those limits are inexorable. 
Courts cannot streamline the required factual inquiry, so as to lower 
decision costs, without raising error costs. They cannot reduce the error 
costs associated with false negatives (by, for example, easing a plaintiff’s 
prima facie proof burden or increasing the difficulty of establishing an 
affirmative defense) without increasing the error costs associated with 
false positives. They cannot reduce the error costs associated with false 
positives (by, for example, raising a plaintiff’s prima facie proof re-
quirements or easing the burden of establishing an affirmative defense) 
without increasing the error costs associated with false negatives. Legal 
changes to reduce one set of costs tend to enhance another. 
 Given this unhappy situation, courts seeking to maximize anti-
trust’s effectiveness, to the ultimate benefit of consumers, should pur-
                                                                                                                      
33 See Hovenkamp, supra note 14, at 19–26 (explaining how market power generates 
social losses). 
34 See Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 2–3; infra notes 88--89 and accompanying text. The 
result of false negatives, an increase in market power, tends to be self correcting, whereas 
false positives, which wrongly condemn not only the defendant’s specific conduct but also 
all other instances of such conduct, can be corrected only by a subsequent court decision 
or a statutory override. See Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 2–3; infra notes 81--82 and ac-
companying text. 
35 See Hovenkamp, supra note 14, at 19–26. 
36 Id. at 4 (“Antitrust is costly. The judges act with imperfect information about the ef-
fects of the practices at stake. The costs of action and information are the limits of anti-
trust.”). 
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sue a simple strategy: craft antitrust rules and standards so as to mini-
mize the sum of decision and error costs. This is the approach pre-
scribed by decision theory, which “sets out a process for making factual 
determinations and decisions when information is costly and therefore 
imperfect.”37 As stated above, error costs in antitrust adjudication are 
the allocative inefficiencies that result from wrongly permitting in-
stances of market power-enhancing practices (the costs of false acquit-
tals) and the productive efficiency losses that result from improperly 
deterring output-enhancing practices (the costs of false convictions).38 
Error costs are therefore a function of the probability that a proffered 
rule will lead to an incorrect judgment and the magnitude of loss that 
will result from that type of error.39 Decision costs are a function of the 
liability rule’s informational requirements and the ease with which it 
can be applied. A decision-theoretic approach to antitrust adjudication 
must therefore account for (1) the likelihood that the liability rule at 
issue will produce an incorrect judgment, (2) the magnitude of losses 
from the various errors the rule might generate, and (3) the difficulty 
of administering the rule. 
 As the following Part shows, all the antitrust decisions the Roberts 
Court has thus far rendered can be defended in light of decision the-
ory’s instruction to craft legal rules so as to minimize the sum of deci-
sion and error costs.40 They therefore represent an optimal—and ulti-
mately consumer-friendly—response to the limits of antitrust. 
II. Decision Theory and the Roberts Court’s Antitrust 
Decisions 
 In considering how the Roberts Court’s antitrust jurisprudence 
reflects a decision-theoretic approach to antitrust adjudication, it is 
helpful to divide the Court’s antitrust decisions into two groups: those 
concerning substantive liability rules and those concerning procedures 
and immunities. The former category includes the Court’s decisions in 
the following cases: Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. in 
2007, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. in 2007, Pa-
cific Bell Telephone Co. v. LinkLine Communications, Inc. in 2009, and Illi-
                                                                                                                      
37 C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 
Antitrust L.J. 41, 41 (1999) (emphasis omitted). 
38 See id. at 45; supra text accompanying notes 33–34. 
39 See id. at 61--62. If P = probability of an error and M = the expected magnitude of 
loss from that sort of error, then error costs = [(Pfalse positive x Mfalse positive) + (Pfalse negative x 
Mfalse negative)]. See id. 
40 See infra notes 41--324 and accompanying text. 
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nois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. in 2006.41 The latter includes 
the Court’s decisions in three other cases: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 
in 2007, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing in 2007, and American 
Needle, Inc. v. NFL in 2010.42 This Article will not discuss the Court’s 
2006 decision in Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, 
Inc.43 Although that decision technically involved a dispute under the 
antitrust laws, the provision at issue, the Robinson-Patman Act, is ex-
pressly not focused on consumer welfare and is thus not readily amena-
ble to the decision-theoretic approach.44 
A. Decisions Concerning Substantive Liability Rules 
1. Leegin and Minimum Resale Price Maintenance 
 Of the Roberts Court’s substantive antitrust decisions, the one that 
has received the most criticism (at least among the popular press) for 
being pro-business, anti-consumer, and “radical” is Leegin Creative Leather 
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., which held that instances of minimum resale 
price maintenance (“RPM”) are not per se illegal but must be evaluated 
on a case-by-case basis under antitrust’s rule of reason.45 One columnist 
from the Baltimore Sun criticized Leegin, predicting that the “[e]lectronic 
bargains of today will be gone by this time next year” and stating that 
“for that you can thank that radical activist Gang of Five on the U.S. Su-
preme Court,” which “slipped through a decision that overturned 96 
years of antitrust law.”46 As those remarks suggest, the perception that 
                                                                                                                      
41 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1115 (2009); Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. 
Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. 
Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006). 
42 Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216--17 (2010); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) 
LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 267–68 (2007); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549 
(2007). 
43 Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006). 
44 See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006); Hovenkamp, supra note 14, at 579 (“[T]he Robinson-
Patman Act cannot be understood as designed to encourage allocative efficiency or to 
maximize consumer welfare. It was designed to protect small businesses from larger, more 
efficient businesses.”). 
45 551 U.S. at 886–87. Minimum RPM (unless otherwise specified, this Article uses the 
terms “minimum RPM” and “RPM” interchangeably) occurs when an upstream seller (e.g., 
a manufacturer) sets the minimum price that a downstream seller (e.g., a retailer) may 
charge for the upstream seller’s product. See Thomas A. Lambert, Dr. Miles Is Dead. Now 
What?: Structuring a Rule of Reason for Evaluating Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 50 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 1937, 1940 n.3 (2009). 
46 Mike Himowitz, Electronic Bargains of Today Will Be Gone by this Time Next Year, Balt. 
Sun, July 5, 2007, at 7D. 
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Leegin represents a radical, pro-business/anti-consumer shift stems from 
the facts that (1) it overruled a long-standing precedent (the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s decision in the 1911 case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. 
Park & Sons Co. decision had declared minimum resale price mainte-
nance to be per se illegal); (2) it was a 5–4 decision that pitted the 
Court’s traditional “conservatives” ( Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, 
Roberts, and Alito) against its traditional “liberals” ( Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer); and (3) it permitted the imposition of 
price floors, which one would expect to raise consumer prices.47 
 In contrast to its characterization in the popular press, however, 
Leegin was not particularly controversial among mainstream antitrust 
scholars. For example, Harvard Law School’s Einer Elhauge, who 
chaired the Obama campaign’s Antitrust Advisory Committee, recently 
advocated a highly restrictive approach to regulating tying and bundled 
discounts, and is no sense a “conservative” on antitrust issues,48 praises 
the Leegin holding and characterizes it as reflecting a consensus view 
among the leading schools of antitrust analysis.49 As he observes, the 
facts that Leegin overturned a ninety-six-year-old precedent and was de-
cided 5–4 are not really troubling at all. Deference to precedent is less 
important, and less expected, in antitrust cases than in other statutory 
cases, for courts have long viewed the Sherman Act’s broad, amorphous 
text as a delegation to craft a quasi-common law reflecting the ever-
expanding insights of economics.50 Economic thinking on RPM has 
evolved dramatically since Dr. Miles was decided in 1911.51 Therefore it 
                                                                                                                      
 
47 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887–95; Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 
U.S. 373, 400 (1911). 
48 Einer R. Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit 
Theory, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 397, 400 (2009); see Professor Einer R. Elhauge, Harv. L. Sch., 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/elhauge/bio.php (last modified Apr. 2, 2010). 
49 Elhauge, supra note 1, at 60 (“If anything was a topic of consensus among the Har-
vard and Chicago schools, it was the proposition that this rule of per se illegality [for min-
imum resale price maintenance] was misguided.”). 
50 Id. at 61--62 (“[T]he text of the U.S. Sherman Act incorporates capacious common 
law language that has long been thought to effectively delegate antitrust issues to the 
Courts for ongoing common law resolution. As a matter of practice, the Court, in fact, 
overrules antitrust decisions in common law fashion all the time.” (internal citations omit-
ted)); see also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 (1933) (“As a 
charter of freedom, the [Sherman] [A]ct has a generality and adaptability comparable to 
that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.”). 
51 Most notably, economists have recognized that RPM may offer substantial procom-
petitive benefits. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Mainte-
nance, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 825, 825 (1955); David A. Butz, Vertical Price Controls with Uncertain 
Demand, 40 J.L. & Econ. 433, 434--36 (1997); Raymond Deneckere et al., Demand Uncer-
tainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as Destructive Competition, 87 Am. Econ. Rev. 619, 
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is entirely appropriate that the substantive antitrust rules evolve accord-
ingly.52 
 As for the four-justice dissent, which was authored by Justice Brey-
er, a former antitrust professor who was certainly aware of the consen-
sus to which Elhauge refers, a careful reading suggests that the dissent-
ers were more concerned with cementing the notion of “super-
precedent,” a key concept for defenders of the prevailing Supreme 
Court case law on abortion rights, than with contesting the actual ma-
jority holding.53 If one focuses solely on the antitrust issues presented 
in the case, Leegin is far less controversial than the Court’s 5–4 vote 
would suggest. 
 The third “troubling” fact about Leegin, that it sanctions manufac-
turer-imposed price floors that are likely to raise consumer prices, still 
remains.54 When viewed through the lens of decision theory, though, 
                                                                                                                      
619--21 (1997); Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforce-
ment Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & Econ. 265, 266--67 (1988); Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCaf-
ferty, Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. Econ. 346, 346--47 
(1984); Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, The Welfare Effects of Resale Price Mainte-
nance, 28 J.L. & Econ. 363, 363--64 (1985); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want 
Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & Econ. 86, 87--88 (1960). 
52 See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 118–19. Indeed, invoking precedent as a basis for 
refusing to move from per se illegality to rule of reason treatment would create an odd and 
indefensible asymmetry. The usual practice is to evaluate a business practice under the 
rule of reason unless and until courts have attained sufficient experience with the practice 
to know that it is always or almost always anticompetitive, in which case the law should 
evolve so that the practice at issue is per se illegal. See id. at 117--19. Permitting the law to 
evolve (in response to economic learning) toward per se illegality, but refusing, on 
grounds of precedent, to permit a learning-inspired evolution from per se illegality to rule 
of reason treatment would create an unfortunate “ratchet” effect and would render anti-
trust a less economically defensible enterprise. See id.; Thomas A. Lambert, Antitrust Super-
precedent, Truth on the Market ( Jan. 17, 2007), http://truthonthemarket.com/2007/ 
01/17/antitrust-superprecedent/. 
53 See Elhauge, supra note 1, at 65–66. Elhauge explains: 
[U]nder standard Harvard School principles, the majority was right to over-
rule the per se rule against vertical minimum price-fixing. The puzzle is what 
provoked a vigorous dissent from Justice Breyer; one of the world’s most so-
phisticated antitrust justices, whose opinions generally have been fully within 
the Harvard School. . . . [T]he fact that Breyer’s dissent referred no less than 
six times to the stare decisis considerations that were cited in a case about re-
strictions on issue-advocacy ads by a right-to-life group made one wonder 
whether the Leegin case had gotten mixed up with larger political disputes 
about abortion and campaign finance regulation. 
Id. 
54 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887–95. 
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this fact renders the decision pro-consumer rather than pro-business.55 
Recall that decision theory calls for courts to evaluate potential liability 
rules in light of three considerations: (1) the likelihood that the rule 
will generate an incorrect result; (2) the magnitude of loss that will re-
sult from the sort of errors the rule is likely to produce (collectively, 
these two considerations determine the rule’s expected error costs); 
and (3) the difficulty of administering the rule (this determines the 
rule’s expected decision costs).56 The question before the Leegin Court 
was whether, in light of these three considerations, social welfare would 
likely be enhanced (i.e., the sum of decision and error costs reduced) 
by moving from Dr. Miles’s rule of per se illegality for RPM to a more 
probing, rule of reason approach.57 The Court decided, for good rea-
son, that social welfare likely would be enhanced.58 
 To see why this is so, consider how Dr. Miles’s per se rule compares 
to Leegin’s rule of reason approach in terms of the three decision-
theoretic considerations set forth above. With respect to the third, dif-
ficulty of administration, the per se rule performed pretty well, though 
perhaps not as well as one might initially suppose. Per se rules, which 
impose antitrust liability without regard to actual anticompetitive effect, 
are usually easy to implement; a plaintiff must show, and the fact finder 
must determine, nothing more than that the defendant engaged in the 
practice at issue.59 Although that is normally a simple matter to decide, 
Supreme Court precedents creating exceptions to Dr. Miles had ren-
dered the inquiry somewhat complicated. For example, the plaintiff 
had to show that the manufacturer had not simply adopted a unilateral 
policy of refusing to deal with discounters, as in the Supreme Court’s 
1919 United States v. Colgate & Co. decision.60 And because of the deci-
sions in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. in 1984 and Business Elec-
tronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. in 1998, which involved the termi-
nation of price-cutting dealers, the plaintiff had to show that the 
                                                                                                                      
55 The “pro-business” characterization is odd here, for the losing plaintiff in Leegin was, 
in fact, a business—a rogue retailer that did not wish to adhere to the pricing constraints 
its manufacturer imposed. See id. at 882–83. 
56 See Thomas A. Lambert, A Decision-Theoretic Rule of Reason for Minimum Resale Price Main-
tenance, 55 Antitrust Bull. 167, 172 (2010); supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
57 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 881–82. 
58 Id. at 905–06. 
59 See, e.g., Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(observing that when the per se rule applies, “[t]he dispositive question generally is not 
whether [the challenged practice] was justified, but simply whether it occurred”). 
60 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 306--08 (1919) (holding that the manu-
facturer’s unilateral, up front refusal to deal with discounters could not constitute an 
agreement and thus could not violate section 1). 
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defendant manufacturer had entered an “agreement” with compliant 
dealers and that the agreement at issue dictated minimum prices, not 
simply non-price matters.61 The Colgate, Monsanto, and Business Electron-
ics decisions, borne out of misgivings about Dr. Miles, substantially en-
hanced the decision costs associated with the per se rule.62 Neverthe-
less, the rule was comparatively cheap to administer. Leegin’s rule of 
reason approach will likely increase the costs of administration, though 
the Court did take steps to constrain those costs by setting forth specific 
factors courts should consider in evaluating the legality of specific in-
stances of RPM and by directing lower courts to craft a structured rule 
of reason (in contrast to the traditional, open-ended rule of reason in-
quiry).63 As explained elsewhere, if structured as the Leegin majority 
contemplated, the rule of reason for RPM may be administered fairly 
efficiently.64 It likely will, though, involve higher administrative costs 
than the Dr. Miles rule. 
 With respect to the other two decision theory considerations, how-
ever, the Leegin approach represents a tremendous improvement over 
Dr. Miles. When it comes to likelihood of error, Dr. Miles was a disaster. 
As the Leegin majority explained, both economic theory and empirical 
evidence suggest that most instances of RPM are procompetitive, so the 
per se rule, which automatically condemned all RPM, was highly likely 
to generate Type I errors.65 
 First consider theory. Manufacturers that distribute their products 
through retailer-dealers make their money on the sale to the dealers, 
                                                                                                                      
61 See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 733--36 (1988) (holding 
that evidence that a dealer was terminated for price cutting could not establish a conspir-
acy with the remaining dealers to maintain prices at some level absent additional evidence 
of an understanding that certain prices were to be charged); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite 
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (holding in a case involving termination of a price-
cutting dealer that plaintiff’s evidence of agreement must tend to exclude the possibility 
that the manufacturer merely terminated the dealer because of poor performance and 
must suggest that the manufacturer and the remaining dealers were committed to a com-
mon scheme involving higher prices). 
62 See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 186--88. 
63 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 907. A rule of reason is almost always more costly to administer 
than a per se rule. Whereas a per se rule requires the court to determine only whether the 
conduct at issue occurred, a rule of reason analysis requires the evaluating court to assess 
whether the challenged conduct had an anticompetitive effect that was not offset by pro-
competitive benefits. See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 104–08, 114–15. 
64 See Lambert, supra note 56, at 168; Lambert, supra note 45, at 1963--64; Christine A. 
Varney, A Post-Leegin Approach to Resale Price Maintenance Using a Structured Rule of Reason, 
24 Antitrust 22, 25 (2009). 
65 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889. For this Article’s definition of Type I errors, see supra text 
accompanying note 34. 
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not the resale to consumers. Their chief objective is to maximize pur-
chases by dealers, whose demand will be determined by consumer de-
mand at the retail level. If a retailer’s mark-up rises but the retailer does 
not otherwise alter its conduct, consumers will reduce their purchases 
and the manufacturer, who captures none of the retail mark-up, will 
lose sales and profits. All else being equal, then, manufacturers want 
retail mark-ups to be as small as possible.66 Because RPM has the effect 
of increasing such mark-ups, manufacturers will normally avoid it un-
less having greater retailer margin induces dealers to provide services 
that enhance demand for the manufacturer’s product and thereby in-
crease consumer sales, in which case the RPM is output enhancing and 
procompetitive. 
 As the Leegin majority explained, RPM tends to promote demand-
enhancing dealer services upon which other dealers may free-ride 
(training, product demonstration, etc.) because it prevents low-service, 
low-cost dealers from profiting by underselling their high-service ri-
vals.67 In addition, RPM may promote demand-enhancing dealer ser-
vices that are not susceptible to free-riding. An RPM policy guarantees 
dealers an attractive profit margin while a liberal right of termination 
can be exercised against dealers with poor sales records. By coupling 
these two elements, a manufacturer encourages dealers, who are retail-
ing experts, to use their own energy and innovation to promote the 
manufacturer’s brand so as to protect the RPM-protected profit mar-
gins. RPM thus provides an efficient mechanism for inducing output-
enhancing dealer services that are difficult to secure via contract.68 In 
addition, RPM may provide great assistance to a manufacturer that is a 
new entrant into a product market; by assuring retailers of a guaran-
teed margin on the manufacturer’s brand, the RPM encourages retail-
ers to take a chance on the new brand, afford it favorable shelf space, 
promote it over established brands, etc.69 
 But manufacturers may also demand (or at least concede to) RPM 
for anticompetitive reasons. Scholars have identified, and the Leegin ma-
jority acknowledged, four such reasons. First, a retailer cartel may de-
                                                                                                                      
66 Id. at 896. 
67 Id. at 890–92; see also Telser, supra note 51, at 89–96. 
68 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 891–92; see also Klein & Murphy, supra note 51, at 266--67. 
69 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 891–92; see also Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, The Economics 
of Resale Price Maintenance, in 3 Issues in Competition Law and Policy 1841, 1848 
(Wayne D. Collins ed., 2008) (“To secure entry, a new entrant may seek to gain retail dis-
tribution by offering independent retailers protections against discounting, in the hope 
that margin protection will induce retailers to market and promote the new product.”). 
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mand that manufacturers impose RPM as a means of shoring up a re-
tailer-level conspiracy.70 Second, a dominant retailer may demand RPM 
in order to protect itself from more efficient retailer rivals.71 Third, col-
luding manufacturers may collectively impose RPM as a means of in-
creasing price transparency (which aids in cartel enforcement) and dis-
couraging cartel participants from cutting prices to dealers.72 And 
finally, a dominant manufacturer may use RPM to “bribe” retailers to 
disfavor non-dominant brands, lest they lose the RPM-guaranteed profit 
margin.73 
 Thus, as the Leegin majority acknowledged, we have two sets of 
theories—one procompetitive, one anticompetitive—as to why manu-
facturers would demand or concede to enhanced retail margins via 
RPM. Which set is likely to explain most instances of RPM? Probably 
the procompetitive theories, for the preconditions to those theories, 
unlike those for the anticompetitive theories, are frequently satisfied.74 
 With respect to the anticompetitive explanations for RPM, the re-
tailer cartel theory is plausible only if certain conditions exist. The first 
is that the retailer market is susceptible to cartelization, which is rarely 
the case, given the low barriers to entry into retail markets. The second 
circumstantial requirement is that either the manufacturer’s brand is 
unique or RPM is also imposed on competing brands of the product, 
since otherwise, consumers would respond to the RPM by switching to 
another brand.75 RPM may operate as a device by which a dominant 
retailer excludes more efficient competitors only where RPM is im-
posed so broadly or on so many brands that more efficient retailers are 
unable to gain a foothold.76 The manufacturer cartel theory is plausi-
ble only where the manufacturer market is susceptible to cartelization, 
due to factors such as concentration, high entry barriers, and so forth, 
and RPM is commonly employed throughout the market because, oth-
erwise, the RPM could not operate to police the cartel.77 And the 
                                                                                                                      
70 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893; see also Lambert, supra note 45, at 1944–45. 
71 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893; see also Lambert, supra note 56, at 175–76. 
72 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892; see also Lambert, supra note 45, at 1945–49. 
73 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894; see Elzinga & Mills, supra note 69, at 1847 (“[RPM] might fa-
cilitate an implicit contract between the manufacturer and [its] retailers of the following 
nature. The manufacturer ensures retailers of an attractive profit margin on sales of its 
own brand in exchange for their refusing to take on the distribution of competing brands, 
including brands offered by new entrants.”). 
74 Lambert, supra note 56, at 181–85. 
75 Id. at 181–82. 
76 Id. at 183–84. 
77 Id. at 183. 
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manufacturer exclusion theory is plausible only where the profit mar-
gin provided by RPM is significant enough to bribe retailers to drop or 
disfavor other brands, and the RPM scheme is implemented broadly 
among retail outlets so that “foreclosed” brands cannot simply distrib-
ute through other retailers.78 Because many retail outlets are now 
committed to low prices, and therefore would not likely switch to 
higher-priced products simply to reap higher margins, they will rarely 
satisfy the second prerequisite to the manufacturer exclusion theory.79 
 The empirical evidence on RPM’s effects confirms this predic-
tion.82 As the Leegin majority observed, both a detailed staff report of 
                                                                                                                     
 Whereas the conditions for anticompetitive uses of RPM will rarely 
exist, the circumstances necessary for procompetitive effects are quite 
common:80 
RPM may be used to ensure point-of-sale services . . . that 
might be the subject of free-riding whenever such dealer-
provided services . . . enhance demand for a manufacturer’s 
product and are susceptible to free-riding . . . . RPM may pro-
vide an optimal means of ensuring dealer performance of un-
specified agreements whenever dealer activities would en-
hance the attractiveness of a manufacturer’s offerings, and the 
quality-enhancing activities are difficult to delineate in ad-
vance or to monitor. RPM may facilitate entry whenever a new 
producer seeks to gain access to or promotion by retail outlets 
that already stock and provide favorable shelf space to well-
established brands.81 
Because these various conditions often exist, procompetitive rationales 
for instances of RPM are frequently plausible, unlike anticompetitive 
effects. Thus, economic theory predicts that most instances of RPM will 
be procompetitive, not anticompetitive, and that a rule of per se illegal-
ity will have a high error rate. 
 
80 Lambert, supra note 56, at 184–85. 
81 Id. 
82 See infra notes 83--86 and accompanying text. In fact, the empirical case against per 
se condemnation of RPM is much stronger than the Leegin majority’s analysis suggests. See 
Joshua D. Wright, Overshot the Mark? A Simple Explanation of the Chicago School’s Influence on 
Antitrust, Competition Pol’y Int’l, Spring 2009, at 189, 205--09 (summarizing recent 
empirical analyses of RPM’s effects on market output). For example, a survey authored by 
several FTC and Department of Justice economists reviewed twenty-four empirical studies 
published between 1984 and 2005 and concluded that “virtually no studies can claim to 
 
78 Id. at 184. 
79 Id. 
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th FTC’s Bureau of Economics and an investigation of litigated RPM 
cases suggest that most instances of RPM are procompetitive rather than 
anticompetitive.
e 
83 Although the Leegin dissent similarly sought to invoke 
                                                                                                                      
have identified instances where vertical practices were likely to have harmed competition.” 
James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 Int’l J. Indus. 
Org. 639, 658 (2005). Similarly, Francine Lafontaine and Margaret Slade reviewed twenty-
thre
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63–82
tive o t most occurred in markets 
. at 81. Although he provided a more equivocal summary of his findings from 
the su y can-
not su The-
ory su at, in 
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studie ined and demonstrating that they do not support the view that 
 
e empirical studies of vertical restraints and concluded: 
[I]t appears that when manufacturers choose to impose such restraints, not 
only do they make themselves better off but they also typically allow consum-
ers to benefit from higher quality products and better service provision . . . . 
The evidence thus supports the conclusion that in these markets, manufac-
turer and consumer interests are apt to be aligned . . . . 
Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: Empirical 
Evidence and Public Policy, in Handbook of Antitrust Economics 409 (Paolo Buccirossi 
ed., 2008). 
83 Thomas R. Overstreet, Jr., Resale Price Mainte
mpirical Evidence 1--2 (1983); see Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Mainten
ical Evidence from Litigation, 34 J.L. & Econ. 263, 292--94 (1991). Thomas Overs
ned RPM’s competitive effect by analyzing all FTC RPM cases from mid
gh 1982, and cataloging existing empirical studies of RPM. Overstreet, sup
, 106–63. With respect to the RPM in the FTC cases, which he took to be representa-
f instances of RPM generally, Overstreet concluded tha
that could support neither manufacturer nor dealer collusion. Id. at 71–81 (discussing lack 
of manufacturer concentration in markets in which RPM was challenged). Overstreet also 
noted that: 
[O]f the 47 cases with data on the number of distributors, over 80 percent in-
volved in excess of 200 dealers. Widespread dealer collusion involving more 
than 100 (or 200) decision makers seems unlikely to be effective or persistent 
in the absence of restrictions on entry . . . or some mechanism for overt co-
ordination . . . . 
Id. at 80. Overstreet concluded that “[i]t is unlikely that there is effective manufacturer 
collusion featuring RPM in all or even most of these markets” and that “available informa-
tion also suggests that the use of RPM is unrelated to widespread dealer collusion in most 
instances.” Id
rvey of empirical studies, close examination of those findings suggests that the
pport the view that RPM is, more often than not, anticompetitive. Id. at 163 (“
ggests that RPM can have diverse effects, and the empirical evidence suggests th
PM has been used in the U.S. and elsewhere in both socially desirable and un
ays.”). But see Lambert, supra note 45, at 1989 n.226 (summarizing the emp
s Overstreet exam
anticompetitive instances of RPM dominate). 
Pauline M. Ippolito examined the 203 reported RPM cases from 1976 through 1982 and 
found that allegations of collusion (which one would expect plaintiffs to assert, if there were 
any basis for doing so) were rare. Ippolito, supra, at 281--82. Only 9.8% of the private cases 
and 13.1 percent of the entire sample of cases included allegations of dealer or manufacturer 
collusion. Id. at 281. By contrast, a large percentage of the cases featured characteristics that 
were more consistent with procompetitive uses of RPM than with anticompetitive collusion. 
See id. at 282. For example, up to 65% of the private cases and up to 68% of the government 
cases involved products for which consumer demand would likely be significantly affected by 
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empirical evidence to support retaining the rule of per se illegality,84 the 
evidence it cited was inapposite. It consisted of studies purporting to 
show that prices were higher in “fair trade” states, which, for a period of 
time, were permitted to declare RPM to be per se legal, than in states 
that did not provide immunity for RPM. Those studies are not convinc-
ing for two reasons. First, even the procompetitive accounts of RPM in-
volve higher consumer prices, which induce output-enhancing dealer 
services, so the existence of such price increases says nothing about the 
competitive effects of RPM.85 Second, fair trade states adopted a rule of 
per se legality for RPM, so the results under fair trade would not neces-
sarily follow from evaluating instances of RPM under the rule of rea-
son.86 It seems, then, that both economic theory and empirical evidence 
suggest Dr. Miles’s automatic condemnation of RPM arrangements is far 
more likely to generate errors than is the rule of reason approach em-
braced in Leegin.87 
 The final decision-theoretic consideration is the magnitude of loss 
ma
from errors. The Dr. Miles rule produced more Type I errors than will 
Leegin’s rule of reason, which will likely tend to reduce errors overall but 
y raise the incidence of Type II errors. When it comes to antitrust, 
though, false convictions tend to produce greater social loss than false 
acquittals.88 When an anticompetitive instance of RPM is improperly 
approved, social cost (allocative inefficiency) may result from market 
                                                                                                                      
the provision of “special services” susceptible to free-riding. Id. at 282–85. Approximately 
43% of the private cases and 28% of the government cases involved products for which the 
dealer’s role in product quality determination is important. Id. at 285–89. And in twenty-four 
of the twenty-eight “simple goods” cases, where special services are not as likely to be demand 
enhancing, the facts were consistent with the use of RPM to enhance dealers’ sales efforts. Id. 
at 289–91. Based on these findings, Ippolito concluded that “service- and sales-enhancing 
theories, taken together, appear to have greater potential to explain the [RPM] practices” 
than do collusion-based explanations. Id. at 291–92. 
84 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 912 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
bserving that higher prices resulting 
from
question, because it com-
Id. 
87 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887–95. 
t 2–3. 
85 Overstreet, supra note 83, at 116–17, 160 (o
 RPM are consistent with both pro- and anticompetitive effects). 
86 See Elhauge, supra note 1, at 61. Elhauge explains: 
[T]his empirical evidence addressed the wrong 
pared prices in states with per se illegality to prices in states with a rule of per 
se legality. A rule of per se legality is likely to allow more anticompetitive ef-
fects than a rule of reason that remains available to redress anticompetitive 
forms of the conduct. Thus, the price effects of switching from per se illegal-
ity to per se legality are not the same as switching from a rule of per se illegal-
ity to a rule of reason, which was the relevant issue here. 
88 See Easterbrook, supra note 27, a
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p er that is created or maintained. When a procompetitive instance of 
RPM is improperly condemned, by contrast, the social cost consists of 
the immediate benefit foregone by stopping the challenged instance 
plus any future benefits that are thwarted because of the precedent 
condemning that particular type of efficient conduct. Whereas the for-
mer harm—market power—is generally self-correcting by entry or, in 
the case of collusion, cheating, the latter harm—economy-wide thwart-
ing of an output-enhancing practice—may be undone only by a court 
decision (or legislative or regulatory development) that corrects the bad 
precedent.
ow
 helpfully constrained 
eci
                                                                                                                     
89 False convictions are therefore more likely to cause greater 
and more durable harm than false acquittals and should thus be more 
stridently avoided by the governing liability rule. 
 The holding of Leegin is thus wholly defensible from the perspec-
tive of decision theory. Both the “likelihood of error” and “magnitude 
of loss from expected errors” considerations weigh heavily in favor of 
rule of reason adjudication. Although the “difficulty of administration” 
consideration might support adherence to the Dr. Miles rule, that con-
cern is not so compelling. As noted, the Dr. Miles rule was actually fairly 
difficult to implement, and the Leegin majority
d sion costs by noting specific factors courts should consider in eval-
uating instances of RPM and by directing the lower courts to craft a 
structured rule of reason.90 Decision theory therefore supports the out-
come in Leegin. 
2. Weyerhaeuser and Predatory Bidding 
 Although the Leegin majority implicitly adopted a decision-
theoretic analysis, the Court’s unanimous decision in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. 
Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. embraced decision theory explic-
 
ning a beneficial practice, the benefits 
Id. 
90 See supra notes 54–65 and accompanying text. 
89 As Judge Easterbrook has explained: 
If the [antitrust] court errs by condem
may be lost for good. Any other firm that uses the condemned practice faces 
sanctions in the name of stare decisis, no matter the benefits. If the court errs 
by permitting a deleterious practice, though, the welfare loss decreases over 
time. Monopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly prices eventually attract entry. 
True, this long run may be a long time coming, with loss to society in the in-
terim. The central purpose of antitrust is to speed up the arrival of the long 
run. But this should not obscure the point: judicial errors that tolerate baleful 
practices are self-correcting while erroneous condemnations are not. 
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itly.91 The court held that predatory bidding plaintiffs must make the 
same two-pronged showing required of predatory pricing plaintiffs.92 
 Plaintiff Ross-Simmons and defendant Weyerhaeuser, which both 
 the Pacific Northwest, regularly operated hardwood lumber sawmills in
bid against each other in purchasing the red alder sawlogs that they 
processed and sold as finished hardwood lumber.93 Ross-Simmons ac-
cused Weyerhaeuser, which had grown to be substantially larger than 
Ross-Simmons and was acquiring about sixty-five percent of the alder 
logs available for sale in the region, of “predatory bidding.”94 Specifi-
ally,c  Ross-Simmons claimed that Weyerhaeuser bought more sawlogs 
than it needed and bid up the price for sawlogs higher than necessary 
to attain the quantity it required.95 At the same time, Weyerhaeuser did 
not increase the price of its output; market prices for finished hard-
wood lumber actually fell.96 This created a revenue squeeze: the saw-
mills’ revenues (reflecting market prices of finished hardwood) fell 
even as the sawmills’ costs (reflecting the unnecessarily high price of 
the most important input) were rising. After enduring this squeeze for 
several years, Ross-Simmons shut down its mill completely in 2001.97 It 
then sued Weyerhaeuser for monopolization and attempted monopoli-
zation under section 2 of the Sherman Act.98 
 At trial, Weyerhaeuser proposed a predatory bidding jury instruc-
tion that incorporated the predatory pricing elements set forth in the 
Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp.99 The Brooke Group Court held that a plaintiff com-
plaining of predatory pricing must establish that (1) “the prices com-
plained of [were] below an appropriate measure of its rival’s costs,” and 
(2) there was “a dangerous probability” at the time of the below-cost 
ricip ng that the rival would eventually “recoup[] its investment” in the 
predation by charging supracompetitive prices.100 Weyerhaeuser main-
                                                                                                                      
91 Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 325--26. 
92 Id. 
316. 
.C. § 2 (2006); Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 316. Specifically, Ross-Simmons main-
tained that Weyerhaeuser had used “its dominant position in the alder sawlog market to 
driv lder sawlogs to levels that severely reduced or eliminated the profit 
mar
93 Id. at 315--16. 
94 Id. at 316. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 549 U.S. at 
98 15 U.S
e up the prices for a
gins of Weyerhaeuser’s alder sawmill competition.” Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 316. 
99 Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 317; see Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222, 224 (1993). 
100 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222, 224. 
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tained that the jury should be instructed that overbidding for sawlogs 
could constitute anticompetitive conduct only if it resulted in Weyer-
haeuser’s operating at a loss, and if a dangerous probability of its re-
coupment of losses existed.101 The district court rejected the proposed 
instruction and instead told the jury that it could find an anticompeti-
tive act if it concluded that Weyerhaeuser “purchased more logs than it 
needed or paid a higher price for logs than necessary, in order to pre-
vent [Ross-Simmons] from obtaining the logs they needed at a fair 
price.”102 Concluding that Ross-Simmons had proven monopolization, 
the jury returned a $26 million verdict, which was trebled to approxi-
mately $79 million.103 
 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
jected Weyerhaeuser’s argument that Brooke Group’s requirements for 
predatory pricing should similarly apply to predatory bidding claims.104 
Reasoning that predatory bidding does not necessarily produce the 
same consumer benefit as predatory pricing (i.e., lower prices for at 
least the short term), the Ninth Circuit concluded that “the concerns 
That standard is not based on a conclusion that low, but above-cost, 
                                                                                                                     
that led the Brooke Group Court to establish a high standard of liability 
in the predatory pricing context do not carry over to this predatory 
bidding context with the same force.”105 It held that the Brooke Group 
standards for predatory pricing liability do not apply to claims of preda-
tory bidding.106 
 In a 9–0 decision authored by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that Brooke Group’s standard of li-
ability does apply to predatory bidding claims.107 The Court began its 
analysis by discussing the rationale for the Brooke Group standard.108 
 
e district court instructed the jury that: 
urchased 
y, in 
 fair 
Confe  (9th 
Cir. 20
103
101 Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 317; see Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222, 224. 
102 Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 317. Th
One of Plaintiffs’ contentions in this case is that the Defendant p
ore logs th  pam an it needed or id a higher price for logs than necessar
order to prevent the Plaintiffs from obtaining the logs they needed at a
price. If you find this to be true, you may regard it as an anti-competitive act. 
derated Tribes of Siletz Indians v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F.3d 1030, 1039 n.30
05) (quoting the lower court’s instruction to the jury). 
 Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 317. 
104 Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians, 411 F.3d at 1035–36. 
105 Id. at 1037--38. 
106 Id. at 1038. 
107 Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 317–18. 
108 Id. at 318--20. 
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pricing can never be anticompetitive.109 Rather, it reflects a recognition 
that courts cannot identify and condemn anticompetitive above-cost 
rice
llowing recovery for above-cost price cutting be-
The i-
mate
 ng, 
whic sim-
ilar ng, 
                                          
p  cuts without chilling legitimate, procompetitive price cuts. As the 
Court explained: 
The first prong of the [Brooke Group] test—requiring that pric-
es be below cost—is necessary because “[a]s a general rule, the 
exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant measure of cost 
either reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged predator, 
and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the 
practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control.” We were particu-
larly wary of a
cause allowing such claims could, perversely, “chil[l] legitimate price 
cutting,” which directly benefits consumers.110 
Court thus acknowledged that the Brooke Group standard is ult
ly concerned with minimizing error costs.111 
The Court then reasoned that the regulation of predatory biddi
h it took to be “analytically similar” to predatory pricing, raises 
error cost concerns.112 It noted that because predatory biddi
                                                                            
109 . It is well understood that so-called “limit” pricing, which occurs when a firm 
ote 2, at 161--62. Although 
anticompetitive.” Id. at 162. In addition, there is the problem of fashioning a remedy. Id. 
Forcing the defendant to raise its price to the monopoly level to invite new entry poses 
seri sumers if, for example, entry does not occur instantly. See id. Alterna-
tivel  price to competitive levels would make eventual 
entr nd would “put the court in the position of a regulatory agency, con-
stan
rcises of both types of market power result in allocative inefficiency, the 
wea
s of predatory-pricing 
and y-bidding involve “strikingly similar allegations.” Id. at 322. A predatory-
 
See id
with market power sets its prices above its costs but below the profit-maximizing level so as 
to deter entry, can be anticompetitive. See Hovenkamp, supra n
such pricing may impose competitive harm and injure consumers in the long run, it is 
simply too difficult for antitrust tribunals to police. As Herbert Hovenkamp has observed, 
“No court has ever developed a workable test for determining when an above-cost price is 
ous risks to con
y, forcing the defendant to lower its
y even less likely a
tly monitoring the dominant firm’s prices to ensure that they stayed near the competi-
tive level.” Id. 
110 Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 319 (second and third alterations in original) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted) (quoting Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223). 
111 See id. 
112 See id. at 321, 323 (“More importantly, predatory bidding mirrors predatory pricing 
in respects that we deemed significant to our analysis in Brooke Group.”). The Court ob-
served that predatory bidding and pricing involve an attempt to attain market power, that 
is, the power to enhance one’s profits by affecting prices. Id. at 319–20. Whereas predatory 
pricing may permit a firm to attain monopoly power and drive output prices upward by 
withholding one’s production, predatory bidding may enable a firm to attain monopsony 
power, enabling it to drive input prices and costs downward by cutting back on one’s pur-
chases. Id. Exe
lth loss that occurs when resources are not directed toward their highest and best uses 
because of price distortions. Id. Moreover, the Court observed, claim
 predator
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like predatory pricing, involves a certain up-front loss and only a specu-
lative future gain, it will rarely be attempted.113 A liability rule making it 
easy to establish predatory bidding would thus entail a high likelihood 
of error (i.e., false convictions). 
 Moreover, as in the predatory pricing context, the magnitude of 
ss 
 that made it easy to punish high bid prices or large pur-
chases of inputs could chill all sorts of procompetitive (or at least be-
nig
lo from false convictions would be great. As with price-cutting, 
“[t]here are myriad legitimate reasons—ranging from benign to af-
firmatively procompetitive—why a buyer might bid up input prices.”114 
For example, the firm might (1) simply miscalculate its input needs; 
(2) anticipate increased consumer demand for its output; (3) face dif-
ferent efficiencies than its input market rivals (e.g., it may be able to 
extract greater value from the input, which would cause it to have a 
higher reservation price, or it may use a particularly input-intensive 
production process, which would cause it to demand more inputs); or 
(4) seek to acquire excess inputs as a hedge against future price in-
creases.115 
 A rule
n) conduct, causing significant social loss. This is particularly the 
case because, as Keith Hylton has observed, the prices generated by 
firms’ unfettered input-bidding produce a tremendous amount of so-
cially valuable information like predictions about future output de-
mand, expectations concerning future input supply, and the like.116 
Thus, consideration of error costs—a function of a legal rule’s likeli-
                                                                                                                      
pricing plaintiff will allege that the defendant reduced the price of its product in order to 
drive the plaintiff out of business so that the defendant, insulated from selling competi-
tion, could then raise its prices above competitive levels. A predatory-bidding plaintiff will 
allege that the defendant deliberately bid up the price of a key input in order to drive the 
plaintiff out of business so that the defendant, insulated from buying competition, could 
then cut back on its input purchases and thereby drive down the price of inputs. Both 
strategies “logically require firms to incur short-term losses on the chance that they might 
reap supracompetitive profits in the future.” Id. 
Despite the similarity of predatory pricing and predatory bidding, Keith Hylton has 
argu
n 
loss
n, supra note 112, at 66–68. 
ed persuasively that predatory bidding poses greater potential for anticompetitive 
harm. See Keith N. Hylton, Weyerhaeuser, Predatory Bidding, and Error Costs, 53 Antitrust 
Bull. 51, 52 (2008). Nonetheless, decision-theoretic considerations—in particular, con-
cerns about error costs—lead Hylton to approve of Weyerhaeuser’s holding. Id. at 52–53. 
113 Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 323 (“Predatory pricing requires a firm to suffer certai
es in the short term on the chance of reaping supracompetitive profits in the future. A 
rational business will rarely make this sacrifice. The same reasoning applies to predatory 
bidding.” (internal citations omitted)). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Hylto
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hood of error and the magnitude of loss from expected errors— sup-
ports application in the predatory bidding context of the admittedly 
stringent Brooke Group liability test. 
 Although the Weyerhaeuser Court focused solely on error costs and 
did not explicitly address decision costs, consideration of such costs 
would only have bolstered its holding. In the context of predatory bid-
ding, the alternative to the Brooke Group standard would be something 
like the jury instruction given by the district court: the defendant is li-
able if it “purchased more [inputs] than it needed, or paid a higher 
price for [inputs] than necessary, in order to prevent [input market 
rivals] from obtaining the [inputs] they needed at a fair price.”117 This 
berts 
n, the holding in LinkLine was ulti-
Court precedents that themselves in-
rp
sort of vague liability rule would open the door to long and costly ex-
peditions to establish the number of inputs “needed,” the price “neces-
sary” to obtain such a quantity, the motives of the defendant in making 
its bids, and the “fair” price that should have been guaranteed to the 
defendant’s rivals. Thus, Weyerhaeuser’s holding effectively minimized 
the sum of decision and error costs, as decision theory prescribes. 
3. LinkLine and “Price Squeezes” 
 Decision theory also played a central role in Pacific Bell Telephone 
Co. v. LinkLine Communications, Inc., in which the Court held that a mo-
nopolization claim cannot arise from a mere “price squeeze” by a verti-
cally integrated firm that possesses monopoly power in the upstream 
(input) market but is not subject to an antitrust duty to deal with its 
rivals in the downstream (output) market.118 As Chief Justice Ro
explained in the majority opinio
mately dictated by two Supreme 
co orated the insights of decision theory.119 Moreover, independent 
decision-theoretic concerns bolster the Court’s holding. 
 Plaintiff LinkLine sold DSL Internet service to retail consumers.120 
So did defendant AT&T.121 LinkLine, however, did not actually own all 
                                                                                                                      
117 Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 317. 
118 See LinkLine, 129 S. Ct. at 1109, 1120. 
119 See id. at 1119--21. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Steven, Souter, and Ginsburg, 
filed a concurring opinion that did not dispute the central holding or reasoning of the 
majority opinion but would have prescribed a different procedural outcome. Id. at 1124 
(Breyer, J., concurring). Specifically, the concurring justices would have allowed the dis-
trict court, on remand, to consider predatory pricing allegations the plaintiff had asserted 
in an amended complaint that was never ruled on by the Ninth Circuit (and thus, in the 
maj re the Supreme Court). Id. at 1124–25. ority’s view, was not properly befo
120 Id. at 1115 (majority opinion). 
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the facilities needed to provide DSL service; it leased such facilities from 
AT&T, its rival in the retail DSL market.122 Antitrust law did not impose 
 a low retail price for the DSL service it sold to 
st
LinkLine’s price squeeze theory consisted of two components—a high 
wh
a duty on AT&T to lease DSL facilities to its retail rivals, but a federal 
communications law did: as a condition for a recent merger, the Federal 
Communications Commission required AT&T to provide access to the 
leased facilities at a price no greater than the retail price of its DSL ser-
vice.123 LinkLine was thus AT&T’s customer in the upstream wholesale 
market (leasing an input—access to DSL infrastructure) and its com-
petitor in the downstream retail market (selling the same output, DSL 
service, to consumers). 
 LinkLine claimed that AT&T had violated section 2 of the Sher-
man Act by engaging in a price squeeze.124 The squeeze occurred be-
cause AT&T charged such a high wholesale price for access to its DSL 
infrastructure, and such
cu omers, that LinkLine found itself excluded from the retail mar-
ket.125 Observing that price squeeze claims had been recognized by 
several circuit courts of appeals, the district court denied AT&T’s mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings on the price squeeze claim.126 It 
then certified its order for interlocutory appeal on the question of 
whether the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Verizon Communications 
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko bars price squeeze claims where the 
parties are compelled to deal under the federal communications 
laws.127 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s denial of AT&T’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
reasoning that price squeeze claims, which were recognized prior to 
Trinko and were not present in that case, remain viable.128 
 In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court reasoned that 
olesale price and a low retail price—neither of which could consti-
tute an antitrust violation under existing precedents.129 A claim based 
on AT&T’s charging a high wholesale price for access to DSL facilities 
                                                                                                                      
121 Id. The defendants’ names and corporate structures changed over the course of the 
litig  to them collectively as AT&T. Id. at 1115 n.1. 
1115. 
ussing proceedings in the district court). 
Line, 129 S. Ct. at 1116; Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trin-
ko, 
at 1120. 
ation—the Supreme Court referred
122 Id. at 1115. 
123 Id. 
124 129 S. Ct. at 
125 Id. 
126 See id. at 1116 (disc
127 Link
540 U.S. 398, 405 (2004). 
128 LinkLine Commc’ns, Inc. v. SBC Cal., Inc., 503 F.3d 876, 877 (9th Cir. 2007). 
129 See LinkLine, 129 S. Ct. 
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would be barred by Trinko.130 That case held that a vertically integrated 
monopolist has no general duty to deal in the upstream market with its 
downstream rivals and that, absent some specific antitrust duty to deal, 
d that: 
otivated the holdings in 
Brook  in 
Link  be 
no p od 
of re ev-
er b ry’s 
ability to regulate prices that are above-cost, but anticompetitively low, 
                                                                                                                     
there can be no antitrust liability for dealing in a shoddy fashion.131 
The Court in LinkLine reasoned that if a firm lacking an antitrust duty 
to deal faces no antitrust liability for dealing and providing poor ser-
vice, then such a firm would also not be liable for dealing and charging 
high prices.132 Thus, LinkLine could not succeed against AT&T on the 
theory that it had charged too high a price for access to DSL facilities 
that it had no antitrust duty to provide. 
 As for the other component of the alleged price squeeze, any 
claim based on AT&T’s charging a low retail price for DSL service 
would be barred by Brooke Group unless LinkLine established the pre-
requisites to predatory pricing liability (i.e., below-cost pricing and a 
likelihood of recoupment).133 Because the complaint before the Su-
preme Court had not included allegations of predatory pricing at the 
retail level, AT&T could face no liability on the basis of its low retail 
prices.134 The Court therefore conclude
Plaintiffs’ price-squeeze claim . . . is . . . nothing more than an 
amalgamation of a meritless claim at the retail level and a mer-
itless claim at the wholesale level. If there is no duty to deal at 
the wholesale level and no predatory pricing at the retail level, 
then a firm is certainly not required to price both of these ser-
vices in a manner that preserves its rivals’ profit margins.135 
 Because decision theory concerns largely m
e Group and Trinko, they were central to the Court’s conclusion
Line.136 As explained above, Brooke Group’s holding that there can
redatory pricing liability absent below-cost pricing and a likeliho
coupment was based not on a belief that above-cost prices can n
e anticompetitive but instead on skepticism about the judicia
 
 fore-
clos e prices.”); Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408--11. 
t 222–24 (positing requirements for predatory pricing 
claim
. 
130 Id. at 1119 (“A straightforward application of our recent decision in Trinko
es any challenge to AT&T’s wholesal
131 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408–11. 
132 LinkLine, 129 S. Ct. at 1120. 
133 See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. a
s). 
134 LinkLine, 129 S. Ct. at 1120. 
135 Id
136 Id. at 1119--21. 
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with  the 
Broo test in 
out chilling pro-consumer price competition.137 In other words,
ke Group holding arose from a desire to limit error costs. The 
that case also constrains decision costs, for inquiries into whether the 
defendant’s prices are below its costs and whether the market is suscep-
tible to a recoupment period are complicated, but are also far less costly 
for the parties and courts than an inquiry into whether the defendant 
has attempted to preclude entry by pricing below its profit-maximizing 
level, which is extremely difficult to ascertain.138 
 Trinko’s holding similarly reflected decision-theoretic considera-
tions. With respect to error costs, the Trinko Court observed that a 
broad rule requiring monopolists to deal with their rivals could impose 
numerous and costly errors by encouraging collusion and reducing 
firms’ incentives to innovate.139 A broad forced-dealing rule would also 
entail high decision costs, for “[e]nforced sharing . . . requires antitrust 
courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, 
and other terms of dealing—a role for which they are ill suited.”140 
When there is a non-antitrust duty to deal with one’s rivals, imposition 
f ao ntitrust liability for deficient dealing (unresponsiveness, shoddy 
service, and so forth) would entail both high error costs and high deci-
sion costs.141 Thus, decision-theoretic concerns underpinned both of 
Trinko’s primary holdings, that there is no general antitrust duty to deal 
with one’s rivals and that there can be no antitrust liability for defi-
ciently discharging a duty imposed by another body of law.142 LinkLine’s 
holding, logically implied by Brooke Group and Trinko, should therefore 
be viewed as a product of decision theory. 
                                                                                                                      
137 See supra notes 109--111 and accompanying text. 
138 See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222–24; cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 162–64 (dis-
cussing difficulty of policing “limit pricing”). 
139 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08. 
pelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is in some ten-
derlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the in-
nvest in those economically 
Id. 
140
141 bility. 
One f
alacrit
diatio nuing 
super unlikely to be an effective 
to-day enforcer of these detailed sharing obligations.” Id. at 414–15. 
8--16. 
Com
ios n with the un
entive foc r the monopolist, the rival, or both to i
eneficial faciliti p lling neb es. . . . Moreover, com e gotiation between competi-
tors may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion. 
 Id. at 408. 
 Id. (“The cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 lia
alse-positive risk is that [a monopolist’s] failure to provide a service with sufficient 
y might have nothing to do with exclusion.”). The Court continues: “Effective reme-
n of violations of regulatory sharing requirements will ordinarily require conti
vision of a highly detailed decree . . . . An antitrust court is 
day-
142 See id. at 40
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 Dennis Carlton has further explained how LinkLine comports with 
a decision-theoretic approach.143 He first observes that any procom-
petitive benefits that would result from recognizing the price squeeze as 
a form of anticompetitive conduct would be small.144 Most of the time, 
a vertically integrated monopolist whose upstream product is used in 
fixed proportions to produce the downstream product will have no in-
nt
to earn some supracompetitive profit.147 But in that situation, consum-
ers may or may not be better off with a rule forbidding the monopolist 
to 
ce ive to engage in a price squeeze to eliminate its rivals in the down-
stream market.145 If there are economic (i.e., supracompetitive) profits 
to be had in the downstream market, the monopolist can capture those 
profits by simply setting its input price at a level that permits its down-
stream rivals to stay in business earning a normal (competitive) rate of 
return but prevents them from earning supracompetitive profits.146 
The monopolist would gain nothing by destroying its downstream rivals 
via a price squeeze; its incremental profit gain in the downstream mar-
ket would be perfectly offset by its loss of profits in the upstream mar-
ket. 
 Admittedly, this analysis may not apply in more complex situations, 
such as when the downstream firm sells a differentiated substitute that 
constrains the monopolist’s pricing and permits the downstream rival 
utilize a price squeeze to eliminate the downstream rival.148 Con-
sumers could be unharmed, or even benefited, if the monopolist began 
                                                                                                                      
143 See Dennis W. Carlton, Should “Price Squeeze” Be a Recognized Form of Anticompetitive 
Con . & Econ. 271, 274--76 (2008). 
d. at 275. Carlton explains: 
 monopolist] cannot gain by driving Firm 2 
e market for B [the downstream product]. 
Id. 
147
148 Id. at 276. 
duct?, 4 J. Competition L
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 271. 
146 See i
Firm 1 [the vertically integrated
[its downstream rival] out of th
The reason is that Firm 1 already has all the power it needs, by assumption, to 
extract the profit from Firm 2 by raising [the price of the input] to just en-
able Firm 2 to earn a normal rate of return without driving Firm 2 out of 
business. Firm 1 gains nothing further by destroying Firm 2, even though any 
sales that Firm 2 would have made would instead be made by Firm 1. Because 
the increased profits that Firm 1 would earn by so doing would be the same as 
Firm 2 (assuming that both firms are efficient), and because that profit on 
Product B is “normal,” there is no extra (above normal) profit to be earned. 
This example is just an illustration of the “one monopoly profit theory” asso-
ciated with the Chicago School. 
 Id. at 275–76. 
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producing the differentiated substitute so as to capture its former rival’s 
supracompetitive profits without having to pay a supracompetitive price 
trust duty to deal would encourage vertically integrated firms 
ith
for the input.149 The elimination of double marginalization could end 
up lowering prices for consumers.150 Thus, a rule prohibiting price 
squeezes to preserve a vertically integrated monopolist’s downstream 
rivals promises only speculative, and probably small, procompetitive 
benefits. 
 And yet the costs of such a rule would be significant. If, as in Lin-
kLine, the vertically integrated monopolist has no antitrust duty to deal 
with its downstream rival, recognition of a price squeeze theory could 
create substantial consumer harm.151 The monopolist could avoid anti-
trust liability altogether if it simply refused to sell inputs to its down-
stream rivals, but it would risk antitrust liability if it made such sales at 
prices that were deemed after the fact to create an exclusionary price 
squeeze.152 Thus, recognition of a price squeeze theory in the absence 
of an anti
w  upstream monopolies to refuse to make any input sales to down-
stream rivals.153 Such refusals would create greater consumer harm 
                                                                                                                      
149 Carlton, supra note 143, at 275--76. Carlton explains: 
If Firm 1 [the vertically integrated monopolist] drives out Firm 2 [the down-
stream rival that produces a differentiated substitute, Product B’], then even 
though it may be less efficient than Firm 2 (which will tend to cause price to 
rise), it may actually lower the price of Product B’. The reason has to do with 
 of double marginalization. 
Id. a
ist charges a supracompetitive 
price See id. 
For ex
 A. In contrast, when Firm 1 pro-
s an additional unit of Product B’, it recognizes that, because it produces 
151
152
 the market for Product B. 
the elimination
t 276. 
150 Id. Double monopolization occurs when a monopol
for an input and its rival charges a supracompetitive price for the end product. 
ample: 
When Firm 2 buys Product A [the input] at PA [the monopoly price], it faces 
a price that is above the marginal cost of Product A, yet PA is the marginal cost 
to Firm 2 of an additional unit of Product
duce
Product A, the additional cost of Product A is not PA, but the lower marginal 
cost of A. 
Id. 
 Id. at 276–78. 
 Id. at 276. As Carlton explains: 
In the absence of a duty to deal, Firm 1 would have no duty to provide Prod-
uct A as an input to Firm 2, but if it did so, it would be subject to potential li-
ability if the prices that it charged for Product A and Product B excluded 
Firm 2 from
Id. 
153 See id. 
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than would continued input sales at high wholesale prices that created 
a price squeeze because an outright refusal to sell the input would de-
prive consumers of other products that incorporate the input and are sold 
only by downstream rivals.154 
 Decision theory therefore counsels rejecting the price squeeze 
theory of liability in the absence of an antitrust duty to deal. In simple 
cases, price squeezes create no competitive harm.155 In more compli-
cated cases, price squeezes may or may not harm consumers, and de-
rm
occasion, cause anticompetitive harm.158 
                                                                        
te ining whether there has been consumer harm requires compli-
cated inquiries into the relative efficiencies of the monopolist versus its 
purportedly excluded rival, the magnitude of double marginalization, 
and the like.156 Moreover, creating price squeeze liability absent a duty 
to deal would simply encourage the vertically integrated monopolist to 
raise the price of its downstream product so as to ensure a sufficient 
margin for its rivals or to stop selling its input to downstream rivals.157 
Both outcomes threaten substantial consumer harm. Accordingly, it is 
simply not “worth it” to recognize a price squeeze theory of liability in 
the absence of an antitrust duty to deal, even if price squeezes may, on 
                                              
154
oduct A, uses it to produce Product C 
as well as Product B and this benefits consumers who otherwise would be 
 do without Product C. Suppose now that Firm 2 can profitably pro-
e for Product A. A price 
at it is subject to a price 
Id. 
155
156
157
158 Price 
Squeez ve ar-
gued y when facts suggest that the mo-
olist utilized the price squeeze “to prevent the smaller [downstream] rival from inte-
grat mary market.” See id. They explain 
thei
 
 See id. at 277. Carlton offers the following example: 
Suppose that Firm 2 uses Product A to produce, in addition to Product B [the 
downstream product the monopolist also produces], some Product C that 
Firm 1 cannot produce. Firm 2 buys Pr
forced to
duce Product C but not Product B at the current pric
squeeze doctrine would permit Firm 2 to complain th
squeeze on Product B. Firm 1 could respond to this liability threat by increas-
ing the price of Product B. This would be bad for consumers, at least in the 
short run . . . . Firm 1 could also avoid liability simply by refusing to deal with 
Firm 2. If it did so, it would deprive consumers of Product C, creating con-
sumer harm at the same time that it avoids antitrust liability. Thus, there is 
the increased risk of significant harm created by the incentive to avoid anti-
trust liability if there is a price squeeze doctrine. 
 See supra notes 144--146 and accompanying text. 
 See supra notes 147--150 and accompanying text. 
 See supra notes 151--154 and accompanying text. 
 But see Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, The Viability of Antitrust 
e Claims, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 273, 299 (2009). Erik and Herbert Hovenkamp ha
for recognition of a limited price squeeze theor
nop
ing upstream into the defendant’s monopolized pri
r recommended rule as follows: 
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4. Independent Ink: Tying and Patents 
 The Court’s unanimous decision in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Inde-
pendent Ink, Inc. rejected the view that a tying defendant’s possession of 
a patent on its tying product gives rise to a presumption that the defen-
dant has market power in the tying product market.159 This greatly re-
ented tying products and is 
etic approach. Moreover, in ex-
res
rket power over the tying product, 
and (3) the tie-in affects a “not insubstantial” amount of commerce in 
the
duced error costs in tying cases involving pat
thus consistent with a decision-theor
p sly rejecting a compromise position advocated by a group of “post-
Chicago” antitrust commentators, the Independent Ink Court further 
recognized the limits of antitrust.160 
 Tying is selling one’s monopoly product, the “tying” product, on 
the condition that the buyer also purchase a separate “tied” product.161 
This practice is currently governed by a quasi-per se rule.162 Under that 
rule, a tie-in arrangement is per se illegal as long as (1) the tie-in in-
volves multiple products, as opposed to a single product consisting of 
multiple parts, (2) the seller has ma
 tied product market.163 
                                                                                                                      
Defendants should enjoy a safe harbor, or per se legality, when the margin be-
tween the wholesale price to the rival and the output price of the finished 
product is greater than the total (fixed + variable) processing costs that the de-
fendant incurs for production between the two stages. . . . If the margin be-
Id. at d re-
quire ed at 
preve  rule 
they p  a situation that they con-
ot require that the tie-in cause sub-
stan arketing opportunities in the tied product market; rather, it must 
 
tween the defendant’s price for the upstream input to the rival and the defen-
dant’s own second-stage output price is below either the defendant’s average 
total or the average variable cost of intervening production, then some further 
inquiry may be necessary. The most likely explanations are joint costs (econo-
mies of scope) or price discrimination, in which cases we would not find liabil-
ity, and we would not force an antitrust tribunal to assume the regulator’s role 
of allocating fixed costs among multiple products. Liability is appropriate in the 
relatively uncommon situation when a margin squeeze has clearly been created 
by the dominant firm in order to prevent the smaller rival from integrating up-
stream into the defendant’s monopolized primary market. 
298–99. Although evaluation of the Hovenkamps’ proposed liability rule woul
empirical data on the incidence, success rate, and cost of price squeezes aim
nting upstream integration, it would be surprising if the complicated liability
ropose, which would impose high decision costs to police
cede is “relatively uncommon,” proved to be justified on decision-theoretic grounds. See id. 
159 547 U.S. at 31. Justice Alito, who was sworn in after the oral argument in Independent 
Ink, did not participate in the decision. See generally id. 
160 See id. at 43–45. 
161 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 28--29 (1984). 
162 See id. 
163 See id. at 8. Importantly, this last element does n
tial foreclosure of m
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 The plaintiff in Independent Ink relied on a Supreme Court dictum 
that “if the Government has granted the seller a patent or similar mo-
nopoly over a product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the 
product elsewhere gives the seller market power.”164 Therefore the 
plaintiff had simply assumed that the defendant, whose tying product 
consisted of patented printer technology, possessed tying market power 
that satisfied the second element.165 The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff had 
failed to establish tying market power, since it had presented no evi-
dence defining the tying product market or establishing the defendant’s 
power within it.166 Citing the aforementioned Supreme Court dictum, 
the Federal Circuit reversed on the ground that tying market power 
should be presumed in light of the defendant’s possession of patents on 
the tying product.167 The narrow issue brought before the Supreme 
Court was thus whether a presumption of tying market power will arise 
when the defendant holds a patent on the tying product.168 Consistent 
with views of antitrust scholars, Congress, and federal antitrust regula-
tors, the Court held that the mere possession of a patent on a tying 
product does not confer market power over the tying product market.169 
                                                                                                                      
simply affect more than a de minimis dollar volume of commerce in the tied market. See 
Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969). 
164 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16. 
165 Independent Ink, 547 U.S. at 31--32, 46 (noting that the tied product was defendant’s 
unpatented ink and that the ink market was competitive). 
166 Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1167, 1173, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 
2002). 
167 Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
168 Independent Ink, 547 U.S. at 31--32. 
169 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)--(5) (2006) (amending patenting laws to mandate proof of 
mar 547 U.S. at 
38–4  E. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law ¶ 1737a (2d ed. 2004) (“[T]here is no 
econ
onomic Structure of 
Inte 003); U.S. Dep’t Justice & FTC, Antitrust Guide-
line
fers market power upon its own-
er.’’
ech. 1, 57 & n.340 (1991) (noting that the market power presumption has been ex-
tens
ption of market power over a patented product 
first
 
ket power in the tying product in the patent misuse context); Independent Ink, 
2; Phillip
omic basis for inferring any amount of market power from the mere fact that the defen-
dant holds a valid patent . . . .”); 1 Herbert Hovenkamp et al., IP and Antitrust § 4.2a 
(2009) (“[C]overage of one’s product with an intellectual property right does not confer a 
monopoly.”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Ec
llectual Property Law 374 (2
s for the Licensing of Intellectual Property § 2.2 (1995) (“Agencies will ‘not pre-
sume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily con
’); Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: “Blessed Be the Tie?,” 4 Harv. 
J.L. & T
ively criticized and citing sources). 
The Court observed that the presum
 arose in a 1917 patent misuse case, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufac-
turing Co., that ‘‘migrated’’ from patent law to antitrust law at the Government’s urging in 
International Salt Co. v. United States, a 1947 case, and was eliminated in the patent context 
by 102 Stat. 4676 in 1988. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5); Independent Ink, 547 U.S. at 38–42; 
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 From the standpoint of decision theory, the merits of Independent 
Ink’s holding are obvious. The market power presumption the Court 
rejected was, put bluntly, an error cost machine. Patents are ubiquitous; 
market power is not. Many, if not most, products incorporating some 
patented technology are sold in competitive markets.170 Accordingly, 
the market power presumption regularly deemed the “tying market 
power” element of a tying claim to be satisfied when, in fact, it was not. 
To the extent the element was designed to screen out non-meritorious 
tying claims, the market power presumption rendered the element 
largely ineffective. In jettisoning the presumption, the Supreme Court 
thus substantially reduced the number of false positives its tying doc-
trine generates and the social losses associated with those mistakes. Al-
though elimination of the market power presumption did raise deci-
sion costs by requiring that plaintiffs actually prove and courts actually 
evaluate claims of tying market power, the increase in decision costs is 
likely dwarfed by the error cost reduction the Court’s holding achieves. 
Accordingly, Independent Ink’s holding makes perfect sense from a deci-
sion-theoretic perspective. 
 The Independent Ink Court further displayed a sensitivity to decision 
theory concerns in rejecting a compromise position on the market 
power presumption.171 In seeking to sustain the judgment in its favor, 
plaintiff Independent Ink presented the Court with a narrower alterna-
tive to its requested holding that possession of a patent creates a pre-
sumption of market power.172 That narrower alternative would have 
created a presumption of tying market power when a defendant with a 
patent on its tying product imposes a “requirements tie,” mandating 
                                                                                                                      
Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Uni-
versal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 509 (1917). The Court reasoned that because “the pat-
ent misuse doctrine provided the basis for the market power presumption, it would be 
anomalous to preserve the presumption in antitrust after Congress has eliminated its 
foundation.” Independent Ink, 547 U.S. at 42. The Court also observed that its conclusion 
that a tying defendant’s tying market power must be proven, not presumed, even when the 
defendant possesses a patent on the tying product “accords with the vast majority of aca-
demic literature on the subject.” Id. at 43 n.4. 
170 See F.M. Scherer, Professor of Econ., Swarthmore Coll., Panel Discussion: The Value 
of Patents and Other Legally Protected Commercial Rights, in 53 Antitrust L.J. 535, 547 
(1984–1985) (‘‘[S]tudies suggest that the vast majority of all patents confer very little mo-
nopoly power.’’). 
171 See Independent Ink, 547 U.S. at 43--44. 
172 Id. 
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that tying product purchasers also purchase their requirements of un-
patented complements from the defendant.173 
 As Post-Chicago scholars Barry Nalebuff, Ian Ayres, and Lawrence 
Sullivan explained in an amicus brief advocating this narrower holding, 
the presumption of tying market power in cases involving patented ty-
ing products and requirements ties would enable antitrust to police the 
use of tie-ins to price discriminate and extract additional consumer 
surplus by metering consumer demand for the tying product.174 Nale-
uff
rejected the narrower holding advocated in the 
mic
actices that the-
 sc
b , Ayres, and Sullivan argued that such price discrimination and 
surplus extraction are anticompetitive effects that are properly ad-
dressed by antitrust.175 
 The Supreme Court disagreed, although it acknowledged that me-
tering tie-ins may result in price discrimination and surplus extrac-
tion.176 Concluding that price discrimination “occurs in fully competi-
tive markets” and that “[m]any tying arrangements, even those involving 
patents and requirements ties, are fully consistent with a free, competi-
tive market,” the Court 
a us brief.177 The Court thus made clear that, although it recognizes 
that price discrimination and additional surplus extraction are possible 
effects of tying, they are not appropriately deemed anticompetitive ef-
fects subject to condemnation under the antitrust laws. 
 This is a salutary acknowledgement of antitrust’s limits. In recent 
years, Post-Chicago theorists have argued that antitrust should pursue 
not simply the extension of market power but also acts that involve the 
extraction of additional consumer surplus, even if the acts do not 
threaten to enhance market power.178 Price discrimination is one of the 
surplus-extractive, but not market power-expanding, pr
se holars would like to police under the antitrust laws.179 But price 
                                                                                                                      
173 Id. at 44. An example of required unpatented complements might include unpat-
ented ink for a patented printer. See id. 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-
dent at 5–24, Independent Ink, 547 U.S. 28 (No. 04–1329). 
eferencing Jefferson Parish’s discussion of price dis-
crim
1(f); Landes & Posner, supra 
note  William J. Baumol & Daniel G. Swanson, The New Economy and Ubiqui-
tous
e 48, at 404–13. 
174 See Brief of Professors Barry Nalebuff et al. as 
175 Id. at 24--27. 
176 Independent Ink, 547 U.S. at 44 (r
ination through tying). 
177 Id. at 45; see also Areeda et al., supra note 169, ¶ 171
 169, at 374–75;
 Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market Power, 70 Anti-
trust L.J. 661, 666 (2003). 
178 See Elhauge, supra note 48, at 426–42; cf. Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, Appropriate 
Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm Conduct 8–14 (Econ. Analysis Grp., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Discussion Paper No. 08-2, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1111665. 
179 See Elhauge, supra not
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discrimination, particularly of the metering variety, frequently en-
hances overall social welfare by expanding market output, so efforts to 
constrain it may involve high error costs.180 
 Moreover, many of the liability rules the Post-Chicago scholars 
have proposed for policing price discrimination and surplus extraction 
are exceedingly difficult to implement and provide little guidance to 
business planners.181 Thus they raise decision costs while chilling busi-
nd deci-
llenges to the business practices of com-
er held that it is not per se illegal for a law-
lly
                                                                                                                     
ness practices that are procompetitive but may be avoided because of 
the lack of legal clarity. The Supreme Court acknowledged that re-
quirements tie-ins may result in price discrimination and surplus ex-
traction but are nonetheless “fully consistent with a free, competitive 
market.”182 In doing so, the Court implied that an extractive effect is 
not enough to render a practice anticompetitive, and it seemingly lim-
ited antitrust’s domain to acts that could enhance market power. The 
Court thereby moved antitrust in a direction decision theory would 
counsel, a direction that recognizes antitrust’s inherent limits. 
5. Dagher and Joint Ventures 
 The Court’s unanimous decision in Texaco Inc. v. Dagher coheres 
with decision theory in that it promises to reduce the error a
sion costs associated with cha
petitor joint ventures.183 Dagh
fu  constituted joint venture to set the price of its products and 
clarified that the “ancillary restraints” doctrine applies only to restraints 
on non-venture activities.184 
 
180 See Benjamin Klein & John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination as an 
Ant
-
pos  (so as to police discounts that cause price 
disc
discounting scheme. See id. As a practical matter, how is a court to determine such 
pric
ities” and that “the pricing decisions of a legitimate joint 
ven ategory of activity that is per se unlawful under § 1 of 
the 
itrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70 Antitrust L.J. 599, 612–13 
(2003). 
181 See Elhauge, supra note 48, at 468–77. For example, Einer Elhauge’s recently pro
ed rule for evaluating bundled discounts
rimination and surplus extraction) calls for courts to determine whether the unbun-
dled price exceeds the “but for” single-product price that the defendant would offer ab-
sent the 
es and how can a bundled discounter be assured that a judge or jury will not deem its 
unbundled price to exceed the but for level? This complicated, vague rule would chill 
bundled discounting. 
182 Independent Ink, 547 U.S. at 45. 
183 547 U.S. 1, 3 (2006). 
184 Id. at 7--8 (holding that the ancillary restraints “doctrine governs the validity of re-
strictions imposed by a legitimate business collaboration, such as a business association or 
joint venture, on nonventure activ
ture do not fall within the narrow c
Sherman Act”). 
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 In 1998, gasoline companies Texaco and Shell formed a joint ven-
ture, Equilon Enterprises, that combined the companies’ downstream 
gasoline refining and marketing operations in the western United 
tate
that plaintiffs, by eschewing that analysis, had failed 
 ra
fully constituted joint venture’s pricing of its own products is not per se 
illegal.195 As long as the joint venture is not a mere sham, the venture’s 
S s.185 The formation of Equilon, which was approved by the Federal 
Trade Commission and the attorneys general of California, Hawaii, Or-
egon, and Washington, created synergies and productive efficiencies 
for Texaco and Shell.186 The gasoline Equilon developed was sold to 
downstream purchasers under the original Texaco and Shell brand 
names, but Equilon charged a uniform price for its gasoline within 
each geographic market.187 After Equilon had commenced operation, 
a class of Texaco and Shell service station owners sued the companies, 
alleging per se illegal horizontal price-fixing because Equilon’s Texaco 
and Shell branded gasoline was offered at a single price.188 Notably, the 
plaintiffs chose not to pursue a rule of reason claim against the gaso-
line companies.189 
 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Texaco 
and Shell.190 It concluded that the rule of reason must govern the 
claim asserted and 
to ise an issue for trial.191 The Ninth Circuit reversed.192 It contended 
that the defendants had not proven that Equilon’s uniform pricing of 
Shell and Texaco branded gasoline was an ancillary trade restraint be-
cause they had failed to show that such unified pricing was reasonably 
necessary to permit Equilon to achieve its legitimate ends.193 Absent 
such proof, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, there should be no “exception” 
to the generally applicable per se rule against horizontal price-fixing.194 
 Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court ruled that a law-
                                                                                                                      
185 Id. at 3–4. 
186 Id. at 4, 6 n.1. 
187 Id. at 3–4. 
188 Id. at 4. 
189 Dagher v. Saudi Refining Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The plaintiffs 
disc on the traditional ‘rule of reason’ test, instead resting their entire 
claim he per se rule or a ‘quick look’ theory of liability.”), rev’d in part sub nom. 
Tex
 
at 1116 (“We think the exception the defendants seek is inconsistent with the 
Sher ate.”). 
 at 8. 
laimed any reliance 
 on either t
aco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
190 See Dagher, 547 U.S. at 4. 
191 Id. 
192 Saudi Refining, 369 F.3d at 1122–25.
193 Id. at 1121–22. 
194 Id. 
man Act as it has been understood to d
195 Dagher, 547 U.S.
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pricing decision cannot constitute horizontal price-fixing (i.e., price-
fixing among competitors) for the simple reason that the co-venturers 
ar not competitors when it comes to the activity of their joint ven-
ture.
e 
t could be 
ns
products, enhance productive efficiency by exploiting economies of 
scope and scale, achieve synergies through pooling complementary 
                                                                                                                     
196 Accordingly, the venture’s pricing must be challenged under the 
rule of reason, not under the per se rule applicable to horizontal price-
fixing.197 With respect to the Ninth Circuit’s analysis under the ancillary 
restraints doctrine, which immunizes certain trade restraints that are 
reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive integration,198 the 
Court clarified that the doctrine governs only “the validity of restrictions 
imposed . . . on nonventure activities.”199 The ancillary restraints doctrine 
has no applicability “where the business practice being challenged in-
volves the core activity of the joint venture itself, namely the pricing of 
the very goods produced and sold by [the joint venture].”200 
 Had it been allowed to stand, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis would 
have generated tremendous error costs. If a lawfully constituted joint 
venture’s product pricing, which is a “core” business activity, were sub-
ject to the per se rule then virtually every post-formation decision of 
the venture would be subject to attack.201 Any decision tha
co trued as involving output reduction, price setting, judgments about 
product marketing, or a limitation on product or service features would 
put venture participants at risk for automatic antitrust liability. To avoid 
application of the per se rule, which applies to horizontal agreements 
to reduce output, to fix prices, to divide markets, and to refuse to com-
pete on product features, the venturers would have to show that the 
decision at issue was necessary for the venture to accomplish its objec-
tive.202 Failure to do so might subject participants to immediate liability 
and treble damages. 
 Such an approach could not help but chill joint venture activity. A 
chilling effect would be costly indeed because competitor joint ventures 
frequently benefit consumers by enabling participants to create new 
 
 note 14, at 194–96. 
47 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added). 
. 
w Handbook § 2.22 (2010 ed.) (catalogu-
ing traints deemed to be per se illegal and outlining the standard necessary 
to a se analysis). 
196 Id. at 6. 
197 Id. at 7. 
198 See Hovenkamp, supra
199 Dagher, 5
200 Id. at 7–8
201 See id. 
202 See William C. Holmes, Antitrust La
horizontal res
void a per 
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assets or skills, and lower transaction costs.203 The Dagher Court’s hold-
ing and its clarification of the ancillary restraints doctrine therefore 
nture’s ultimate 
se and Regulatory Preclusion 
 Justice st rules in 
rein in a particularly costly species of Type I error.204 
 In addition, Dagher is likely to reduce the decision costs associated 
with challenges to the conduct of competitor joint ventures. By insulat-
ing the core business decisions of a lawfully constituted joint venture, 
the decision forces consolidation of concerns about joint activity into 
the earlier proceeding on the joint venture’s legality.205 It avoids multi-
ple proceedings every time the joint venture engages in some core ac-
tivity that could be construed as unnecessary to the ve
objective.206 
B. Decisions Concerning Procedures and Immunities 
 Like its decisions on substantive antitrust liability rules, the Roberts 
Court’s three decisions on antitrust procedures and immunities have 
reflected decision theory concerns. 
1. Credit Suis
Breyer, who has long advocated crafting antitru
light of the limits of antitrust, authored the majority opinion in Credit 
Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing.207 Unsurprisingly, the Court explic-
itly embraced decision-theoretic reasoning in holding that antitrust 
                                                                                                                      
203 See Hovenkamp, supra note 14, at 194, 201–03, 205, 211–14 (describing competitor 
joint ventures and the various benefits they deliver). 
204 See Dagher, 547 U.S. at 6--8. 
205 . at 6--7. See id
206 See id. at 6--8. 
in them to clients. They must be administratively workable and 
ther
724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983). Au-
thor ry Wright, Justice Breyer stated: 
 to embody every economic complexity and qualification may 
207 551 U.S. 264, 267 (2007); see Town of Concord, Mass. v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 
17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[A]ntitrust rules are court-administered rules. They must be clear 
enough for lawyers to expla
efore cannot always take account of every complex economic circumstance or qualifi-
cation.”); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 
ing the majority opinion in Bar
Rules that seek
well, through the vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive, under-
cutting the very economic ends they seek to serve . . . . [W]e must be con-
cerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a particular type 
of undesirable pricing behavior end up discouraging legitimate price compe-
tition. 
724 F.2d at 234. 
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challenges to certain securities marketing practices were implicitly pre-
cluded by the federal securities laws.208 
 The plaintiffs in Credit Suisse were investors who had purchased 
reviewed its 
rec
pervise the practice; (3) whether the regulator has, in fact, exercised its 
regulatory authority; and (4) whether permitting the antitrust action 
woul
 that 
no o red 
                                                                                                                     
newly issued securities in initial public offerings (IPOs).209 Various in-
vestment banks had formed underwriting syndicates to help issuing 
companies sell their newly issued securities, and the plaintiffs claimed 
that the syndicates had unlawfully agreed with one another not to sell 
shares of a popular new issue to any buyer who would not commit to: 
buy additional shares of the security in the future at escalating prices, 
buy less desirable securities in addition to the popular issue, or pay the 
underwriter an unusually high commission on subsequent security pur-
chases.210 The defendant banks moved to dismiss the complaint on the 
ground that the federal securities laws impliedly preclude application of 
the antitrust laws to the conduct in question.211 The district court 
agreed and dismissed the claim, but the Second Circuit reversed.212 
 Reversing the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court first 
p edents addressing the relation of the securities laws to the antitrust 
laws.213 Those precedents, the Court observed, establish that the securi-
ties laws implicitly preclude an antitrust complaint when there is a “clear 
repugnancy” between the complaint and the securities laws or, put dif-
ferently, when the two are “clearly incompatible.”214 The precedents also 
prescribe four factors that are critical in determining whether such in-
compatibility exists: (1) whether the challenged practice lies squarely 
within an area of financial market activity that the securities laws seek to 
regulate; (2) whether an administrative body has legal authority to su-
d risk conflicting guidance, requirements, or standards.215 
With respect to the complaint before it, the Court concluded 
ne could “reasonably dispute” that the first three factors favo
 
se, 551 U.S. at 285. 
id. at 270; In re Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Lit., 287 F. Supp. 2d 497, 499 
(S.D
redit Suisse First Bos. LTD, 426 F.3d 130, 170, 172 (2d Cir. 2005); IPO 
Ant
sing United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Deal-
ers,
208 Credit Suis
209 Id. at 267. 
210 Id. 
211 See 
.N.Y. 2003). 
212 Billing v. C
itrust Litigation, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 524--25. 
213 Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 271–75 (discus
 Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 729--30 (1975); Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 689 
(1975); Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 360 (1963)). 
214 Id. at 275. 
215 Id. 
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implicit preclusion.216 Indeed, the activities in question lay squarely 
within the sphere of securities law regulation, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) had statutory authority to supervise the 
challenged activities, and the SEC had, in fact, exercised its authority to 
w and concluding that 
ain
ed-of conduct and 
ill 
                                                                                                                     
regulate the type of conduct at issue.217 The only question before the 
Court, then, was whether the plaintiff’s complaint threatened to create 
a conflict between antitrust and securities law.218 
 The plaintiffs maintained that their lawsuit (and others like it) 
could not be incompatible with securities law concerns because the 
SEC had already disapproved of the complained-of activities and would 
likely continue to do so into the foreseeable future.219 Thus, they con-
tended, there could be no significant downside to allowing them to 
pursue their antitrust claims. In rejecting that vie
m tenance of the antitrust action at issue would be incompatible with 
the securities laws, the Court made little effort to identify specific 
points of conflict between the securities and antitrust laws. Instead, it 
invoked decision theory concerns, comparing the expected error costs 
of permitting the type of action at issue to the expected error costs of 
deeming such actions to be implicitly precluded.220 
 Contrary to the plaintiffs’ claim that there could be no downside 
to antitrust lawsuits attacking anticompetitive conduct of which the SEC 
had already disapproved, the Supreme Court saw a cause for concern: 
potential antitrust condemnation of socially beneficial securities mar-
keting practices (Type I errors).221 Even if one assumes, as the Court 
did, that the SEC has disapproved of the complain
w likely continue to do so in the future, antitrust actions based on 
securities marketing practices are prone to generate false convic-
 
t 276–77. The Court explained: 
 underwriters’ efforts jointly to promote 
Id. at 2
“Is an antitrust suit such as this likely to prove practically incompatible with the 
SEC
216 Id. 
217 Id. a
[T]he activities in question here—the
and to sell newly issued securities—is central to the proper functioning of 
well-regulated capital markets. . . . [T]he law grants the SEC authority to su-
pervise all of the activities here in question. . . . . [T]he SEC has continuously 
exercised its legal authority to regulate conduct of the general kind now at is-
sue. 
77. 
218 Id. (
’s administration of the Nation’s securities laws?”). 
219 Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 278. 
220 Id. at 279–84. 
221 Id. at 279–82. 
912 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:871 
tions.222 The Court pointed to four factors that create potential for 
such errors. The first is the fine distinctions between permissible and 
impermissible conduct in the securities marketing context.223 Second is 
the need for securities-related expertise, which generalist courts lack, to 
draw these distinctions and to determine whether in fact the SEC’s dis-
approval of a complained-of practice is likely to remain permanent.224 
Third is the fact that the evidence presented in antitrust lawsuits arising 
from securities marketing practices would likely permit contradictory, 
but mutually reasonable, inferences.225 The fourth is the high risk of 
inconsistent results as antitrust plaintiffs “bring lawsuits throughout the 
Nation in dozens of different courts with different nonexpert judges 
and different nonexpert juries.”226 The Court asserted the combination 
of these factors “make mistakes unusually likely” in this context: 
Together these factors mean there is no practical way to con-
fine antitrust suits so that they challenge only activity of the 
kind the investors seek to target, activity that is presently un-
lawful and will likely remain unlawful under the securities law. 
Rather, these factors suggest that antitrust courts are likely to 
            
make unusually serious mistakes in this respect. And the 
threat of antitrust mistakes, i.e., results that stray outside the 
narrow bounds that plaintiffs seek to set, means that under-
writers must act in ways that will avoid not simply conduct that 
the securities law forbids (and will likely continue to forbid), 
but also a wide range of joint conduct that the securities law 
permits or encourages (but which they fear could lead to an 
antitrust lawsuit and the risk of treble damages).227 
                                                                                                          
2
223 Id. at 279 (“[O]nly a fine, complex, detailed line separates activity that the SEC 
permits or encourages (for which respondents must concede antitrust immunity) from 
activ itably will) forbid (and which, on respondents’ theory, 
sho  antitrust attack).”). 
l citation omitted). 
er relevant to Congress’ determination of which institution should regulate a 
par f market activities).”). 
22 See id. 
ity that the SEC must (and inev
uld be open to
224 Id. at 280–81 (“[T]o distinguish what is forbidden from what is allowed requires an 
understanding of just when, in relation to services provided, a commission is ‘excessive,’ 
indeed, so ‘excessive’ that it will remain permanently forbidden. And who but the SEC itself 
could do so with confidence?”) (interna
225 Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 281 (“[E]vidence tending to show unlawful antitrust activity 
and evidence tending to show lawful securities marketing activity may overlap, or prove 
identical.”). 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 282; see also id. (“This kind of problem exists to some degree in respect to oth-
er antitrust lawsuits. But here the factors we have mentioned make mistakes unusually 
likely (a matt
ticular set o
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 ing 
the nt: 
the m  that false posi-
ves
h the 
Having thus disposed of the first part of the formula for estimat
cost of Type I errors, the Court turned to the second compone
agnitude of losses from such mistakes. It observed
ti  would create significant social costs in the context at hand, for 
“the role that joint conduct plays in respect to the marketing of IPOs, 
along with the important role IPOs themselves play in relation to the 
effective functioning of capital markets means that the securities-
related costs of mistakes is unusually high.”228 The Court thus con-
cluded that the error costs of permitting the antitrust action at issue 
would likely be high.229 
 The Court then compared those expected costs to the expected 
error costs of deeming the action to be implicitly precluded.230 Any er-
rors resulting from such a decision would, of course, consist of Type II 
rrore s, false acquittals of practices that would have been condemned 
had antitrust actions been permitted. The Court concluded that the 
costs associated with such errors would likely be relatively small. First, if 
the conduct is already forbidden by the SEC, as the plaintiffs assumed, 
either the SEC or private investors could bring securities lawsuits to 
stop the offensive practices.231 Moreover, there is less need for antitrust 
to intervene to thwart anticompetitive practices because the securities 
laws already require the SEC “to take account of competitive considera-
tions when it creates securities-related policy and embodies it in rules 
and regulations.”232 Accordingly, antitrust liability in this context adds 
little social value, and the costs of reining in its reach so that it fails to 
capture some anticompetitive conduct would be relatively low.233 
 It was thus a comparison of the costs of too much antitrust inter-
vention versus too little that led the Court to conclude that there was 
an inevitable conflict between the sort of antitrust action at issue and 
the effective implementation of the securities laws.234 Althoug
                                                                                                                      
228 Id. 
229 See id. 
82–84. 
51 U.S. at 283 (“For one thing, the SEC actively enforces the rules 
and
eed for an antitrust lawsuit is unusu-
ally 
 
230 Id. at 2
231 Credit Suisse, 5
 regulations that forbid the conduct in question. For another, . . . investors harmed by 
underwriters’ unlawful practices may bring lawsuits and obtain damages under the securi-
ties law.”); see supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
232 Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 283. 
233 Id. (observing that “any enforcement-related n
small” in this context because SEC involvement “makes it somewhat less necessary to 
rely upon antitrust actions to address anticompetitive behavior”). 
234 Id. at 284. The Court summarized its reasoning as follows: 
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C rt did not expressly analyze likely decision costs, consideration of 
such costs would only have bolstered its conclusion. A legal regime 
permitting plaintiffs to choose between two types of lawsuits (involving 
very different substantive doctrine, procedural rules, and damages 
formulae) in challenging a single set of business practices would almost 
certainly involve higher decision costs than a regime dealing with such 
practices under a single body of law. Thus, the reasoning of Credit Suisse 
explicitly embraces decision theory’s error cost analysis, and the hold-
ing of the case comports with decision theory as a whole. 
2. Twombly and Parallel Conduct 
 Rivaling Leegin as the Roberts Court antitrust decision most per-
ceived to be pro-business, anti-consumer, and radical i
ou
s Bell Atlantic 
my likely stems from the fact that it 
 issue in every lawsuit. And the Su-
 of local telecommunications 
rv
                                     
Corp. v. Twombly.235 Twombly’s infa
dealt with pleading standards, an
preme Court later upped the ante by expressly extending Twombly’s 
plausibility requirement beyond the antitrust conspiracy context.236 
Putting aside Twombly’s effect on pleading standards generally and fo-
cusing solely on the decision’s implications for antitrust lawsuits, the 
decision appears to have been largely motivated by, and is wholly con-
sistent with, principles of decision theory. 
 The narrow issue in Twombly was whether a plaintiff adequately 
pleads the agreement element of a Sherman Act section 1 claim merely 
by alleging parallel conduct and asserting that a conspiracy existed.237 
The plaintiffs in the case were consumers
se ices who sued the defendants, regional telephone companies 
known as Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (“ILECs”) for allegedly 
entering two competition-limiting agreements: (1) to impede efforts by 
                                                                                 
In sum, an antitrust action in this context is accompanied by a substantial risk 
of injury to the securities markets [high Type I error costs] and by a dimin-
ished need for antitrust enforcement to address anticompetitive conduct [low 
Type II error costs]. Together these considerations indicate a serious conflict 
between, on the one hand, application of the antitrust laws and, on the other, 
proper enforcement of the securities law. 
Id. 
235 550 U.S. at 549; see Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 473, 476 (2010) (“Scholars have been largely critical of [Twombly]”); A. Benja-
min Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 431, 432 (2008) (noting that Twombly is a 
“remarkable departure from established doctrine”). 
236 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950--51 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548--49. 
237 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548–49. 
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Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (“CLECs”) to enter the ILECs’ 
markets, and (2) to refrain from entering each others’ markets.238 In 
attempting to allege these two agreements, the plaintiffs averred that 
the defendants had uniformly followed the same patterns of opposing 
CLECs and failing to enter other ILECs’ markets.239 The plaintiffs then 
baldly stated that defendants, having engaged in such parallel conduct, 
had entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy.240 The prob-
lem was that the parallel conduct alleged was as consistent with unilat-
eral conduct as with an agreement.241 Each ILEC had an independent 
incentive both to oppose CLECs’ entrance into its market, and not to 
disrupt the traditional market divisions by entering others’ markets.242 
 Plaintiffs understood that mere parallel conduct and an assertion 
of conspiracy would not enable them to survive a motion for summary 
judgment.243 At a minimum, they would have to produce evidence 
tending to exclude unilateral, self-interested conduct as a basis for the 
ILEC’s parallel conduct.244 They maintained, though, that they need 
not set forth facts tending to exclude non-collusive explanations for 
parallel conduct at the pleading stage.245 In support of that position, 
they cited the Supreme Court’s statement in Conley v. Gibson that “a 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”246 Conceding 
that a literal reading of this statement from Conley would prevent dis-
missal of plaintiffs’ complaint, since they could later prove some set of 
                                                                                                                      
238 Id. at 549–51. 
oting that plaintiffs had alleged “that the ILECs ‘engaged in parallel 
con
e id. at 551 & n.2 (quoting Complaint ¶¶ 51, 64, Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. 
Sup
8. 
.S. at 560 (“Plaintiffs do not, of course, dispute the requirement of 
plau
adio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595--98 (1986); 
Mon
.S. at 560--61. 
239 Id. at 550--51 (n
duct’ in their respective service areas to inhibit the growth of upstart CLECs”). The 
Court observed that the ILECs’ purported agreements to avoid competing against each 
other were “to be inferred from the ILECs’ common failure” to enter each other’s mar-
kets. Id. 
240 Se
p. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02-10220). “Although in form a few stray statements 
speak directly of agreement, on fair reading these are merely legal conclusions resting on 
the prior allegations.” Id. at 564. 
241 Id. at 566. 
242 Id. at 566–6
243 Twombly, 550 U
sibility and the need for something more than merely parallel behavior [to survive a 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.]”). 
244 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith R
santo, 465 U.S. at 465; Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 
537, 540--41 (1954). 
245 Twombly, 550 U
246 355 U.S. 41, 45--46 (1957). 
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undisclosed facts that would tend to exclude unilateral action as the 
explanation for the defendants’ parallel conduct, the Court abrogated 
Conley’s “no set of facts” standard.247 It further held that a Sherman Act 
section 1 complaint should be dismissed if all it alleges is parallel con-
duct coupled with a bald assertion of conspiracy.248 
 Twombly’s holding on section 1 pleading standards comports with 
decision theory’s overarching prescription to minimize the sum of error 
and decision costs. In terms of error costs, permitting such plaintiffs’ 
ely to be 
we
complaints to proceed to discovery could be disastrous. Plaintiffs’ law-
yers are well aware that antitrust discovery can impose huge costs and 
that defendants frequently settle antitrust actions to avoid such costs and 
the risk of treble damages. Both the likelihood and magnitude of errors 
would have been high in Twombly because the precedent would have 
encouraged plaintiffs’ lawyers to search out parallel business conduct 
like the failure to pursue some business opportunity, baldly assert that 
there was an “agreement” to engage in such conduct, prepare onerous 
discovery requests, and hope to extract a settlement.249 Decision costs 
also would have been high because unfounded antitrust conspiracy 
claims would have to be dealt with in costly summary judgment pro-
ceedings rather than via relatively cheap motions to dismiss.250 
 Compared to the error and decision costs that would have resulted 
had the Twombly plaintiffs been allowed to proceed with their claim, the 
error and decision costs created by the Court’s holding are lik
lo r. Any errors resulting from the Court’s holding will consist of false 
negatives—that is, improper dismissals under Twombly of meritorious 
conspiracy claims. Plaintiffs can avoid dismissal under Twombly if they 
allege either an actual agreement or consciously parallel business be-
havior coupled with facts suggesting that the parallel conduct is more 
likely a product of agreement than unilateral action.251 Therefore the 
only antitrust conspiracy claims likely to be significantly impeded by 
                                                                                                                      
247 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (“[A]fter puzzling the profession for 50 years, [Conley’s] 
famous [‘no set of facts’] observation has earned its retirement.”). 
248 Id. at 569–70. 
, a plaintiff could avoid 
dism n economically plausible assertion that the conduct at issue would 
not ense for the defendant unless it had reached an understanding with 
the s that they would all follow the same course of conduct. See Elhauge, supra 
not
249 Id. at 567--70. 
250 See id. 
251 Id. at 569--70; see Elhauge, supra note 1, at 71. For example
issal by making a
 make economic s
other firm
e 1, at 71 (“[T]he requisite additional evidence could be provided not only by direct 
evidence of a conspiracy, but also by evidence that indicates that the parallel conduct ei-
ther was implausible without an explicit agreement or followed common invitations or 
secret meetings.”). 
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Twombly’s pleading requirements are those that involve no known 
agreement and no known “plus factors” suggesting a collusive explana-
tion for parallel conduct.252 Although this is not necessarily an insig-
nificant set of potential collusion claims, it seems likely that pre-
complaint investigation of legitimate claims would usually reveal either 
sufficient facts to allege an actual agreement or economic factors tend-
ing to exclude the possibility that the parallel conduct resulted from 
independent, unilateral action. Moreover, any judgment that a com-
plaint was inadequate under Twombly would likely be entered without 
prejudice, so plaintiffs (and others similarly situated) could continue to 
monitor the situation and file suit if and when they uncovered facts 
suggesting an actual agreement or establishing plus factors.253 Given 
that cartels are fragile and generally require some policing efforts, it is 
likely that plaintiffs monitoring genuine collusion would eventually dis-
cover facts that, when pled, would allow meritorious claims to pro-
ceed.254 
 Thus, the error costs resulting from Twombly’s holding, although 
perhaps not insignificant, are likely less than those that would have re-
sulted had the Supreme Court held as plaintiffs desired.255 Moreover, 
the decision costs associated with the Twombly rule are likely less than 
those that would have been imposed under the alternative holding. 
Although Twombly may have the effect of forcing multiple complaints 
and motions to dismiss, it avoids the far greater costs associated with 
protracted discovery and expensive summary judgment proceedings to 
dispose of meritless collusion claims based solely on consciously parallel 
conduct and conclusory conspiracy allegations. 
 In addition to Twombly’s holding on the pleading standards gov-
erning antitrust conspiracy claims, another aspect of the decision, one 
concerning substantive liability standards under Sherman Act section 1, 
similarly comports with decision theory.256 As Einer Elhauge has ob-
served, Twombly clarified a point that “was widely understood before, 
but surprisingly had never been explicitly decided in prior Supreme 
Court decisions,” namely, that mere “interdependent parallel conduct, 
                                                                                           
or mere oligopolistic coordination, does not suffice to show an antitrust 
                           
252 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569--70. 
253 See id. at 561--64. 
254 See Business Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. at 727 (“Cartels are neither easy to form nor 
easy to maintain.”). 
255 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548--52. 
256 Id. at 568. 
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conspiracy under U.S. law.”257 The Court clarified that point in con-
cluding that no actionable agreement would arise from the ILECs’ uni-
form decision not to enter each other’s markets but instead to “sit[] 
tight, expecting their neighbors to do the same thing.”258 
 Over the years, prominent antitrust scholars, including Judge 
Richard A. Posner and Herbert Hovenkamp, have asserted that courts 
ou
ructure of the market at 
sue
sh ld construe section 1’s agreement requirement in a more “eco-
nomic,” less “lawyerly” fashion, so as to capture instances of oligopolis-
tic coordination.259 The key difficulties with such an approach lie in 
giving guidance to oligopolists about what is allowed and forbidden, 
and in articulating administrable means by which courts may identify 
tacit collusion. The first matter is difficult because firms in oligopolistic 
markets inevitably know at the time they set their prices that those pric-
es are interdependent, and it is thus difficult to define a prohibition in 
a way that notifies them of how they must behave.260 The second matter 
is difficult because legal parallel conduct resulting from competition 
frequently resembles illegal tacit collusion. 
 Judge Posner proposed that courts determine the existence of ac-
tionable tacit collusion by: (1) analyzing the st
is  to see if it is “propitious for the emergence of collusion”; (2) ex-
amining various pieces of economic evidence that indicate whether tac-
it collusion is in fact occurring; and (3) on the basis of these two ex-
aminations, making a gestalt-like determination as to whether collusion 
is occurring.261 Although it sounds simple enough, implementation of 
the suggested approach would actually be quite complicated. For ex-
ample, Posner suggests that courts consider seventeen factors in their 
examination of market structure (step one), and he lists fourteen fac-
tors that would suggest the existence of actual collusion (step two).262 
                                                                                                                      
257 See Elhauge, supra note 1, at 71; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553--54. 
258 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 568. 
–93; Richard A. 
Pos  Suggested Approach, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1562, 1563--66 
(19
t: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 656 (1962). 
[is] 
con is “[n]o fringe of small sellers”; (3) there is 
“[i]
 
259 See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 126–36; Posner, supra note 15, at 69
ner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A
69). 
260 Elhauge, supra note 1, at 71; Donald Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the 
Sherman Ac
261 Posner, supra note 15, at 69, 93--100. 
262 Id. at 69--93. The seventeen factors of step one are whether: (1) the “[m]arket 
centrated on the selling side”; (2) there 
nelastic demand at [the] competitive price”; (4) “[e]ntry takes a long time”; (5) the 
“[b]uying side of [the] market [is] unconcentrated”; (6) the product is standard; (7) the 
product is nondurable; (8) “[t]he principal firms sell at the same level in the chain of distri-
bution”; (9) “[p]rice competition [is] more important [in the relevant market] than other 
forms of competition”; (10) there is a “[h]igh ratio of fixed to variable costs”; (11) the firms 
2011] The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust 919 
In light of this complexity, Hovenkamp has sought to distance himself 
from the details of Posner’s proposal.263 He has not offered a workable 
alternative, however.264 This is not surprising, for it is nearly impossible 
to craft a legal rule that will accurately characterize highly subtle busi-
ness behavior while remaining easy to implement.265 
 The upshot is that attempts to police tacit collusion under section 
1 are likely to involve high error costs (as competitive acts that lead to 
similar business practices are deemed collusive, and firms respond by 
altering their behavior from the competitive norm) and high decision 
costs (as generalist courts are forced to grapple with highly subtle, eco-
nomically complex, multi-faceted tests such as those proffered by Judge 
Posner). Sticking to the traditional “lawyerly” understanding of agree-
ment may well allow some collusion to go unpunished. But collusion is 
always difficult to sustain, and many facilitating practices—any that are 
adopted via agreement—are already regulated under the lawyerly un-
derstanding of agreement, so the costs of false negatives are not likely 
                                                                                                                      
face “[s]imilar cost structures and production processes”; (12) “[d]emand [is] static or de-
clining over time”; (13) “[p]rices can be changed quickly”; (14) “[s]ealed bidding” is used; 
(15) the “[m]arket is local”; (16) the firms in the market employ “[c]ooperative practices”; 
and (17) “[t]he industry’s antitrust ‘record’” suggests attempted collusion. Id. at 69–79 (type-
face altered). 
The fourteen factors of step two are as follows: (1) “[f]ixed relative market shares”; (2) 
“[m]arketwide price discrimination”; (3) the existence of price information exchanges; (4) 
“[r]egional price variations”; (5) whether the firms have submitted identical sealed bids; (6) 
abrupt changes of price, output, or capacity in the market; (7) “[i]ndustrywide resale price 
maintenance”; (8) whether the market shares of industry leaders are declining; (9) the 
“[a]mplitude and fluctuation of price changes”; (10) the elasticity of demand at the market 
price; (11) the “[l]evel and pattern of profits”; (12) whether “[m]arket price [is] inversely 
correlated with [the] number of firms or elasticity of demand”; (13) the use of “basing-point 
pricing”; and (14) the existence of “exclusionary practices.” Id. at 79–93 (typeface altered). 
263 See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 133 (observing that Posner’s approach toward 
identifying markets conducive to collusion is “more difficult for courts to manage”). Ho-
venkamp further argues that Posner’s approach to identifying the existence of tacit collu-
sion would “pose formidable administrative difficulties.” Id. at 134. 
264 See Thomas A. Lambert, Tweaking Antitrust’s Business Model, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 153, 171 
(2006) (reviewing Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Exe-
cution (2005)) (analyzing Hovenkamp’s discussion of the limitations of the Posner proposal 
and his failure to provide an alternative means of identifying facilitating devices that are im-
posed unilaterally). 
265 See id. (“When it comes to tacit collusion, [Hovenkamp] cannot have his cake and 
eat it too: he must either approve the sort of complicated inquiry Posner proposes or fall 
back on the ‘lawyerly’ understanding of agreement, which is admittedly inaccurate but 
easy to work with.”). Business behavior can be subtle, making it difficult to determine if 
behavior is tacit collusion or parallel behavior resulting from common competitive consid-
erations. See id. 
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to be that great.266 Thus, the Court’s now-explicit rejection of oligopo-
listic coordination as an “agreement” for purposes of Sherman Act sec-
tion 1 likely reduces the sum of decision and error costs.267 It seems, 
then, that both the express holding of Twombly and its implicit clarifica-
tion of what constitutes a horizontal agreement are consistent with de-
cision theory.268 
3. American Needle and the Intra-Enterprise Immunity Doctrine 
 The Roberts Court’s most recent antitrust decision, American Nee-
dle, Inc. v. NFL, resulted in the first Supreme Court judgment in favor of 
an antitrust plaintiff since 1992.269 Given that the Court cut back on the 
scope of an antitrust immunity, thereby permitting more antitrust ac-
tions to proceed to discovery, the decision might at first seem inconsis-
tent with decision theory’s focus on the limits of antitrust.270 But, as 
Judd Stone and Joshua Wright have recently explained, American Needle 
actually moves antitrust in a direction consistent with decision theory’s 
instruction to minimize the sum of decision and error costs.271 
 At issue in American Needle was whether a vote by the members of 
the NFL to authorize an action by a corporate entity they created and 
controlled, the National Football League Properties (NFLP), could con-
stitute a contract, combination, or conspiracy for purposes of Sherman 
Act section 1.272 In 1963, the members of the NFL established NFLP to 
develop, license, and market their intellectual property.273 For almost 
four decades, NFLP granted nonexclusive licenses, permitting multiple 
manufacturers and vendors to produce and sell team-branded ap-
parel.274 Plaintiff American Needle received such a nonexclusive li-
                                                                                                                      
266 See supra note 254 and accompanying text; see also Lambert, supra note 264, at 171 
(observing that courts routinely condemn cartel facilitators adopted by agreement, “rea-
soning that the agreement element . . . is satisfied by the agreement to employ the facilita-
tor”). 
267 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553--54. 
268 Id. at 553--54, 569--70. 
269 130 S. Ct. at 2216--17. Prior to American Needle, the last Supreme Court decision in 
favor of an antitrust plaintiff was Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., almost 
twenty years prior. 504 U.S. 451, 451 (1992). 
270 American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2216--17. 
271 See Judd E. Stone & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Formalism Is Dead! Long Live Antitrust 
Formalism! Some Implications of American Needle v. NFL, 2010 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 369, 370--
72. 
272 American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2208. 
273 Id. at 2207. 
274 Id. 
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cense.275 In 2000, the teams voted to authorize NFLP to grant exclusive 
licenses, and NFLP granted Reebok International Ltd. a ten-year exclu-
sive license to produce and sell trademarked headwear for the NFL 
teams.276 NFLP then declined to renew American Needle’s nonexclusive 
license. American Needle sued, claiming that the agreements between 
the NFL, its teams, NFLP, and Reebok violated sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act.277 
 In defending against American Needle’s section 1 claim, the de-
fendants asserted that they were incapable of conspiring “because they 
are a single economic enterprise, at least with respect to the conduct 
challenged.”278 The district court agreed, holding that the NFL, NFLP, 
and respective NFL teams qualified as a “single entity” and therefore 
could not conspire in violation of section 1.279 On appeal, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, carefully limiting its 
holding to whether the defendants were acting as a single entity with 
respect to the particular conduct at issue, the licensing of teams’ intel-
lectual property.280 American Needle then petitioned the Supreme 
Court for writ of certiorari on grounds that the defendants were capa-
ble of conspiring with respect to the challenged conduct.281 Somewhat 
surprisingly, the defendants also petitioned for writ of certiorari on 
grounds that the Seventh Circuit should have held more broadly that 
the NFL and other sports leagues act as a single entity generally, not 
just with respect to some of their conduct.282 Disregarding the Solicitor 
General’s advice to deny certiorari, the Supreme Court accepted the 
appeal, characterizing the issue before it as 
whether the NFL respondents are capable of engaging in a 
“contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy” as defined by § 1 
                                                                                                                      
275 Id. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
278 American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2208. 
279 Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 942--943 (N.D. Ill. 
2007). 
280 Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736, 743–44 (7th Cir. 2008). The Seventh Circuit 
reasoned that NFL football itself must be produced collectively, that promotion of such 
jointly produced football involves a shared economic interest (not independent interests), 
that promotion includes the licensing of intellectual property, and that the teams’ joint 
licensing through NFLP therefore failed to deprive the market of independent centers of 
decision making. Id. 
281 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i--ii, American Needle, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (No. 08-
661). 
282 See Brief for the NFL Respondents at i, American Needle, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (No. 08-
661). 
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of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, or . . . whether the alleged 
activity by the NFL respondents “must be viewed as that of a 
single enterprise for purpose of § 1.”283 
 American Needle therefore afforded the Court an opportunity to re-
consider the contours of the “intra-enterprise immunity” doctrine.284 
That doctrine recognizes that even the obviously unilateral conduct of 
individual business firms often involves some literal agreements like 
those between agents of the firm, but generally should not be consid-
ered concerted conduct for purposes of Sherman Act section 1.285 The 
point of the intra-enterprise immunity doctrine is to insulate from liabil-
ity those literal agreements, such as understandings between a parent 
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, that cannot really reduce 
competition by removing independent centers of decision making from 
the economy and thereby potentially consolidating market power.286 
 In 1984, the Supreme Court most fully articulated the intra-
enterprise immunity doctrine in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube 
Corp., in which the Court had to decide whether a parent corporation 
and its wholly owned subsidiary were capable of “conspiring” for pur-
poses of section 1.287 In answering that question in the negative, the 
Court began by noting two fundamental and distinct screens inherent 
in the Sherman Act: section 1 prohibits only “concerted” conduct but 
does not require that the defendant(s) possess market power; section 2 
reaches “unilateral” conduct but generally requires actual market pow-
er or a dangerous probability of attaining it.288 Because section 1 lacks 
section 2’s market power screen, the Court reasoned, it is important to 
honor its concerted conduct screen by finding a section 1 violation only 
when a literal combination has “deprive[d] the marketplace of inde-
pendent centers of decision-making” by joining two entities that would 
                                                                                                                      
283 American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2208; see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
at 1, American Needle, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (No. 08-661). 
284 American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2210--11. 
285 See id. at 2209–11. 
286 Id. at 2211. 
287 467 U.S. 752, 755 (1984). The defendants, Copperweld and its wholly owned sub-
sidiary, collectively contacted customers and suppliers to discourage them from doing 
business with the plaintiff, Independence Tube. Id. at 756--57. Based on that conduct, In-
dependence Tube sued Copperweld and its subsidiary, alleging that they had engaged in a 
conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of Sherman Act section 1. Id. at 755--57. The 
defendants maintained that they were incapable of conspiring. See id. at 755--58. 
288 Id. at 767–69 (distinguishing between sections 1 and 2 of Sherman Act). 
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otherwise be expected to pursue their own, perhaps divergent, inter-
ests.289 
 When it comes to a parent corporation and the wholly owned sub-
sidiary that it fully controls and whose gain and loss it captures in full, 
the Court reasoned, divergent interests are impossible.290 Thus, the 
Court concluded, a literal combination between a parent corporation 
and its wholly owned subsidiary does not deprive the market of inde-
pendent centers of decision making and thus cannot constitute a con-
tract, combination, or conspiracy for purposes of Sherman Act sec-
tion 1.291 
 Copperweld was a bit of a mixed bag. As Stone and Wright have ex-
plained, the Court’s desire to eliminate liability under Sherman Act 
section 1 for some literal combinations was laudable.292 When a literal 
combination involves no actual or threatened market power and does 
not deprive the market of any independent center of economic deci-
sion making, it is highly unlikely to harm consumers.293 Instead, the 
literal combination has probably been effected because it is efficient. 
Assigning liability for such combinations would thwart efficient rela-
tionships without providing any benefit for consumers.294 A Copperweld 
approach that allows early termination of conspiracy claims premised 
on harmless intra-enterprise combinations thus seems desirable from a 
decision-theoretic perspective. 
 Copperweld was a mess, though, in terms of its direction on how to 
identify literal combinations that should be immune from section 1 
scrutiny.295 In concluding that Copperweld and its wholly owned sub-
sidiary were incapable of conspiring, the Court reasoned that 
                                                                                                                      
289 Id. at 769. 
290 Id. at 771–72. 
291 Id. 
292 See Stone & Wright, supra note 271, at 375. 
293 See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771--72. 
294 See Stone & Wright, supra note 271, at 375. Stone & Wright explain: 
Copperweld immunity provided an easily articulated rationale that mapped on-
to straightforward economic intuition: a parent and a wholly owned subsidi-
ary neither could nor should be expected to behave as potential competitors 
might. Rival firms predicating Section 1 claims on wholly internal behavior 
are therefore unlikely to increase net consumer welfare by doing so, and 
courts should be unwilling to entertain these claims. 
Id. 
295 See id. at 375–81 (discussing difficulties resulting from Copperweld’s imprecise for-
mulation of a test for identifying entities incapable of conspiring). 
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[a] parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete 
unity of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate; 
their general corporate actions are guided or determined not 
by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but one.296 
Although this is all true, the Court created some confusion by simulta-
neously emphasizing the “unity of interest” of a parent and its wholly 
owned subsidiary and the fact that the two entities are subject to com-
mon control.297 Implementation difficulties were bound to arise be-
cause unity of interest and common control need not follow each other. 
Firms with unified interests may lack common control, and commonly 
controlled business divisions may diverge in their interests.298 
                                                                                                                     
 In applying Copperweld, lower courts generally latched onto the 
“unity of interests” language, looking to see if the parties to the pur-
ported agreement face any divergence in their incentives.299 This 
proved problematic. For one thing, focusing on whether the combin-
ing units share a unity of interests led to significant divergence in out-
comes.300 Some courts construed unity of interests broadly, holding, for 
example, that pure sister corporations, or wholly owned subsidiaries of 
a common parent, merit Copperweld immunity.301 Broad holdings also 
determined that a franchisor and its franchisees could be a single en-
tity, that separately owned franchisees may constitute a single entity, 
and that one firm’s ownership of a bare majority of the other’s stock 
creates a single entity.302 
 
 
296 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771. 
297 See Stone & Wright, supra note 271, at 375–76. 
298 See id. As Stone and Wright observe, “Members of an oligopolistic cartel certainly 
enjoy a ‘unity of interests’ at least in the short-run; various directors of a division within a 
single corporation hold at least partially divergent interests with regards to future business 
strategies for their divisions and the company as a whole.” Id. at 375. 
299 Id. at 376–78. 
300 Id. at 377–78. 
301 See Davidson & Schaaf, Inc. v. Liberty Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 
1995) (holding that two wholly owned subsidiaries of the same parent cannot conspire 
under section 1); Century Oil Tool, Inc. v. Prod. Specialties, Inc., 737 F.2d 1316, 1317 (5th 
Cir. 1984) (holding that a group of individuals with joint ownership over a parent com-
pany and its two subsidiaries have section 1 immunity). 
302 See Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 862 F. Supp. 1378, 1385 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(“Because the Ritz theaters share common owners and leadership and operate as a single 
entity, we hold that there can be no Sherman Act conspiracy between them.”); Williams v. 
Nevada, 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1030--31 (D. Nev. 1992), aff’d, 999 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that “[t]he cornerstone of . . . § 1 violation—competition between entities—does 
not exist in this case” between franchisor and franchisee); Novatel Commc’n, Inc. v. Cellu-
lar Tel. Supply, Inc., No. Civ.A.C85-2674A, 1986 WL 798475, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 1986) 
(“The 51% ownership retained by Novatel-Canada assured it of full control over Carcom 
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 Other courts were disinclined to find a unity of interests. Some 
ruled, for example, that sibling corporations sharing a common parent 
are not a single entity.303 Others held that a parent and subsidiary cor-
poration are not a single entity if more than a de minimis percentage of 
the subsidiary’s stock is owned by someone other than the parent.304 
 In addition to creating implementation difficulties, the focus on 
whether business units share a unity of interests ultimately seems inap-
posite to whether they are, in reality, a single economic entity.305 As 
Judge Easterbrook has noted, there are often incentive conflicts among 
agents within what is obviously a single firm, and there is frequently no 
divergence in interests within obvious cartels.306 As Stone and Wright 
explain, a more economically sensible approach would endeavor to 
immunize from antitrust liability those literal combinations involving 
parties who are subject to common control.307 Such an approach would 
correspond to the economic understanding of the firm, which consists 
of a body in which resources are allocated according to managerial fiat 
to reduce transaction costs, avoid hold-up problems resulting from as-
set-specific investments, and create performance incentives.308 
 That, however, is not the tack the Court took in American Needle. 
Instead, it disregarded control questions and focused exclusively on 
whether the defendants possessed a complete unity of interests.309 In 
holding that the NFL members could conspire in jointly authorizing 
NFLP to grant exclusive licenses, the Court emphasized that “[a]lthough 
NFL teams have common interests such as promoting the NFL brand, 
they are still separate, profit-maximizing entities, and their interests in 
licensing team trademarks are not necessarily aligned.”310 The Court then 
observed that although “[c]ommon interests in the NFL brand partially 
                                                                                                                      
and assured it could intervene at any time that Carcom ceased to act in its best interests. 
Thus, Carcom and Novatel-Canada are incapable of conspiring for purposes of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act.”). 
303 See Aspen Title & Escrow, Inc. v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1477, 1486 (D. Or. 
1987). 
304 See Leaco Enter., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 737 F. Supp. 605, 608–09 (D. Or. 1990). 
305 See Stone & Wright, supra note 271, at 379–80. 
306 See Chicago Prof’l Sports, Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Even a 
single firm contains many competing interests. . . . Conflicts are endemic in any multi-
stage firm . . . .”); supra note 298 and accompanying text. 
307 See Stone & Wright, supra note 271, at 379–80. 
308 See id. 
309 See id. at 393–95. 
310 American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2213 (emphasis added). 
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unite the economic interests of the parent firms . . . the teams still have 
distinct, potentially competing interests.”311 
 The Court was not persuaded by the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning 
that because a joint venture is necessary to produce NFL football, pro-
motion of the jointly produced product, including the licensing of in-
tellectual property, should be deemed unilateral conduct of the single 
joint venture.312 It stated that “[t]he justification for cooperation is not 
relevant to whether that cooperation is concerted or independent ac-
tion,”313 and it emphasized that “necessity of cooperation” does not 
necessarily “transform[] concerted action into independent action.”314 
Rather, the need for cooperation is relevant to (1) whether concerted 
conduct is evaluated under the rule of reason and (2) how that con-
duct fares under the rule.315 Indeed, the Court emphasized that al-
though the NFL members’ joint conduct would not be exempt from 
liability under the intra-enterprise immunity doctrine, it might still pass 
muster under a rule of reason analysis.316 
 In sum, the Court seemed to reason that only a complete unity of 
interests will invoke the intra-enterprise immunity doctrine, that the 
need for joint conduct to produce a product is not enough to render 
that conduct unilateral, but that the rule of reason may acquit joint ac-
tions that appear to be output-enhancing. 
 This analysis comports with decision theory and displays a sensitiv-
ity to the limits of antitrust even though it weakens the degree to which 
the intra-enterprise immunity screen may weed out meritless antitrust 
actions and permits more claims to proceed to costly discovery. To see 
why this is so, consider the justices’ questions at oral argument. As 
Stone and Wright observe, the oral argument centered on the relative 
costs and benefits of intra-enterprise immunity and rule of reason ad-
judication as alternative means of screening out meritless antitrust con-
spiracy claims.317 They assert that the Court “to its credit was very much 
focused on the ‘compared to what?’ question,” apparently seeking to 
construct screening mechanisms in a manner that would minimize 
                                                                                                                      
311 Id. (alteration omitted) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
312 See supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
313 American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2214. 
314 Id. 
315 Id. at 2216–17. 
316 Id. 
317 See Stone & Wright, supra note 271, at 391 (“At oral argument, the Court repeatedly 
stressed its concerns with the relative efficiency and utility of Rule of Reason analysis, in-
cluding various filters that might apply to screen out low-quality claims, versus the theo-
retically simpler—but heretofore unpredictable—Copperweld screen.”). 
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administrative and error costs.318 In the end, the Court surmised that 
Copperweld, which had generated tremendous confusion among the 
lower courts and had led to extensive and costly disputes over single-
entity status, was not a very cost-effective screening mechanism.319 
 There are, however, alternative methods for screening out anti-
trust conspiracy claims involving related entities whose combination 
would not seem to threaten consumer harm. The most obvious one, 
the focus of the justices’ questioning, is the rule of reason itself.320 
Since the time Copperweld was decided, courts and commentators have 
provided some “structure” to the rule of reason as applied to joint ven-
tures, making the rule easier to administer, more predictable, and less 
prone to generate errors and their associated costs.321 
                                                                                                                      
 
318 Id. at 392. 
319 See id. at 392--93. 
320 See id. at 391–92 (describing questions from oral argument). Judge Michael Boudin, 
who has taught antitrust at Harvard, had suggested that the rule of reason could substitute 
for intra-enterprise immunity as a means of weeding out meritless antitrust conspiracy 
claims based on complex business relationships that seem not to threaten harm. See Fraser 
v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 58 (1st Cir. 2002). Having explained that many 
antitrust conspiracy cases present hybrid business arrangements somewhere between a 
single company and a cooperative arrangement among competitors, he wrote: 
The law at this point could develop along either or both of two different 
lines. One would expand upon Copperweld to develop functional tests or crite-
ria for shielding (or refusing to shield) such hybrids from section 1 scrutiny 
for intra-enterprise arrangements. This would be a complex task and add a 
new layer of analysis; but where the analysis shielded the arrangement it 
would serve to cut off similarly difficult, intrusive scrutiny of such intra-
enterprise activities under extremely generalized rule of reason standards. It 
would also prevent claims, clearly inappropriate in our view, under per se rules 
or precedents dealing with arrangements between existing independent 
competitors. 
The other course is to reshape section 1’s rule of reason toward a body of 
more flexible rules for interdependent multi-party enterprises. Sports leagues 
are a primary example but so are common franchising arrangements and 
joint ventures that perform specific services for competitors (e.g., a common 
purchasing entity.) Certainly the trend of section 1 law has been to soften per 
se rules and to recognize the need for accommodation among interdepend-
ent enterprises. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
321 See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769--81 (1999); NCAA v. Bd. of Re-
gents, 468 U.S. 85, 117--20 (1984); Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 105–07 (eschewing an 
open-ended rule of reason and explaining that economic analysis and modern court deci-
sions support a structured rule of reason). Stephen Calkins has also observed that the rule 
of reason has become more predictable and easier to apply since Copperweld was decided: 
Back in 1984 when Copperweld was decided, the Solicitor General pointed to 
the spectre of near-certain illegality that followed from finding a Section 1 
conspiracy. Today, much of what was then viewed as almost automatically ille-
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 Of course, rule of reason adjudication occurs after costly discovery, 
so the rule may not provide the optimal device for screening out pat-
ently meritless conspiracy claims. There is, though, another screen. As 
Stone and Wright emphasize, Twombly’s requirement that antitrust con-
spiracy plaintiffs plead a “plausible” claim, including a plausible theory 
of anticompetitive harm, provides an additional mechanism for screen-
ing out meritless conspiracy actions.322 They explain that “Twombly dis-
missals indeed satisfy both components of a workable substitute for Cop-
perweld immunity—they both allow for an early [pre-discovery] dismissal 
of marginal antitrust cases and force antitrust plaintiffs to articulate 
theories of anti-competitive harm grounded in economics.”323 Thus, the 
advent of a structured, more predictable, and “cheaper” rule of reason, 
coupled with more stringent pleading standards, enabled the Court to 
jettison another costly screening mechanism.324 When American Needle is 
read, not in isolation but in light of the Court’s entire section 1 juris-
prudence, it appears to be consistent with an effort to minimize the sum 
of decision and error costs related to antitrust adjudication. 
III. Some Predictions for the Future 
 In light of the decision-theoretic perspective that appears to un-
derlie the Roberts Court’s antitrust jurisprudence, what can we predict 
about the Court’s future antitrust decisions? This question is slightly 
complicated by the fact that the composition of the Supreme Court has 
just recently changed: on August 7, 2010, Justice Elena Kagan was 
sworn in to replace retiring Justice John Paul Stevens.325 That devel-
opment, though, is unlikely to alter the degree to which the Court em-
                                                                                                                      
gal is considered lawful under the rule of reason. This suggests that Judge 
Boudin’s approach (as I read it) makes sense: today, there is less need to rely 
on expansive applications of Copperweld to permit procompetitive activity to 
continue, and there’s more freedom to let the rule of reason distinguish the 
lawful from the unlawful. 
Stephen Calkins, Professor of Law, Wayne State Univ. Sch. of Law, Panel Discussion, Cop-
perweld: The Basics and Beyond (Aug. 28, 2002), in Antitrust Source, Mar. 2003, at 4, 
available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/03/03/copperweld.pdf. 
322 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (to survive a motion to dismiss, an antitrust plaintiff 
must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”); Stone & 
Wright, supra note 271, at 403–06. 
323 Stone & Wright, supra note 271, at 403. 
324 See id. Note that new, more stringent pleading standards require plaintiffs to set 
forth a “plausible” theory of anticompetitive harm. See id. 
325 See Peter Baker, Kagan Is Sworn in as the Fourth Woman, and 112th Justice, on the Su-
preme Court, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 2010, at A13. 
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braces the decision-theoretic approach. Even if Justice Kagan turns out 
to oppose the decision-theoretic perspective, she is unlikely to alter the 
balance of power on the Court. That is because Justice Stevens, whom 
she is replacing, was himself somewhat reluctant to afford decision the-
ory a large role in antitrust adjudication.326 Indeed, he explicitly dis-
avowed error cost analysis in his concurring opinion in the 2007 case of 
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, where he wrote: 
Surely I would not suggest, as the Court did in Twombly, and as 
it does again today, that either the burdens of antitrust litiga-
tion or the risk “that antitrust courts are likely to make unusu-
ally serious mistakes,” should play any role in the analysis of 
the question of law presented in a case such as this.327 
I will therefore proceed on the assumption that the recent change in 
Court composition will either strengthen the influence of decision the-
ory (if Justice Kagan turns out to favor such analysis) or leave it un-
changed (if she, like her predecessor, is skeptical). 
 Assuming the Roberts Court stays the course, this Article predicts 
that it will abrogate the per se rule against tying and hold that tie-ins 
must be evaluated under a rule of reason requiring the plaintiff to 
prove substantial tied market foreclosure. The Article also predicts that 
the Court will eventually create certain safe harbors for loyalty rebates 
and bundled discounts that are, in some sense, “above-cost.” 
A. Tying 
 As explained above, tying is currently subject to a quasi-per se rule, 
under which a tie-in is per se illegal if: it involves two separate products, 
the defendant has market power in the tying product market, and the 
tie-in affects a “not insubstantial” dollar volume of commerce in the 
tied product market.328 Efficiency-minded antitrust scholars have long 
criticized this rule because it condemns even those tie-ins that do not 
foreclose a significant percentage of marketing opportunities in the 
tied product market, despite the fact that such foreclosure is necessary 
to augment the defendant’s market power.329 Those scholars have thus 
contended that tying, like exclusive dealing, should be evaluated under 
                                                                                                                      
326 See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 286–87 (2007) (Stevens, 
J., concurring) (quoting id. at 282 (majority opinion)) (internal citation omitted). 
327 Id. at 287. 
328 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
329 See Areeda et al., supra note 169, ¶¶ 1701, 1703d3; Posner, supra note 15, at 198. 
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a rule of reason that focuses on the degree to which the practice fore-
closes otherwise available marketing opportunities.330 Because many 
business practices may be alternatively characterized as tie-ins or as in-
stances of exclusive dealing, it makes sense to treat the two practices 
under a single liability rule that requires the plaintiff to establish all 
prerequisites to market power enhancement, including substantial 
market foreclosure.331 
 In 1984, in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, the Court 
came quite close to adopting a foreclosure-focused rule of reason for 
tying, with four concurring justices expressly calling for abrogation of 
the per se rule.332 Given economists’ relentless criticism of the rule and 
the Roberts Court’s apparent willingness to upset precedent to align 
antitrust doctrine with economic learning, the Court is likely to recon-
sider this issue in the future.333 If it does so, it will likely be confronted 
with a set of arguments defending the quasi-per se rule on the ground 
that tying may allow a defendant to price discriminate and thereby ex-
tract greater consumer surplus, even if the tie-in could not extend the 
scope of the defendant’s market power.334 In light of these potential 
effects, defenders of the quasi-per se rule would argue, the Court 
should maintain the existing tying doctrine so as to protect consumers 
from harm.335 
 Looking forward, if the Roberts Court is as committed to decision 
theory as the foregoing analysis suggests, it will reject the reasoning of 
                                                                                                                      
330 See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 198–206; Christian Ahlborn et al., The Antitrust 
Economics of Tying: A Farewell to Per Se Illegality, 49 Antitrust Bull. 287, 291 (2004). 
331 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 44–45 (1984) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (observing that the tie-in at issue could also be analyzed as exclusive deal-
ing); Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 200--01 (observing that exclusive dealing arrangements 
can often be characterized as tying, thereby permitting plaintiffs to take advantage of the 
stricter quasi-per se rule). 
332 466 U.S. at 27--29 (“The time has therefore come to abandon the ‘per se’ label.”); see 
id. at 35 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
333 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887–95 (2007) 
(overruling the 1911 Dr. Miles precedent based on economic learning since decision was 
rendered); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct 
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act 89 (2008) (observing that no panelist in an ex-
tensive series of hearings on exclusionary practices had endorsed the Supreme Court’s 
tying rule and that many had criticized it). 
334 See Elhauge, supra note 48, at 403–13 (widely noted article discussing the so-called 
“power effects” of tie-ins in). 
335 Id. at 425. Elhauge observes that if tying’s price discrimination and surplus extrac-
tion effects are deemed anticompetitive, “the focus on tying market power and tied dollar 
amount does not mean that the doctrine fails to require evidence of anticompetitive ef-
fects. That focus instead means that tying doctrine correctly requires proof of the elements 
necessary to achieve anticompetitive effects.” Id. 
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the status quo defenders and will hold that tying, like exclusive dealing, 
must be evaluated under a foreclosure-focused rule of reason. Price 
discrimination, particularly of the metering variety that tying often fa-
cilitates, frequently enhances market output and total efficiency by 
bringing into the market groups of low-valuation customers who would 
not pay the defendant’s profit-maximizing, uniform price.336 A defen-
dant can increase its own profits and expand market output by dis-
criminating in favor of those customers and charging them an above-
cost price that is below their reservation price. Such a defendant will 
also often, though not always, enhance static efficiency by increasing 
total surplus of producers and consumers.337 Perhaps more impor-
tantly, the freedom to engage in tying-induced price discrimination 
may promote dynamic efficiencies. By rewarding producers who sell to 
customers at above-cost prices, price discrimination encourages con-
sumer-friendly efforts to develop new, unique products and to differen-
tiate products in ways consumers find desirable.338 
                                                                                                                     
 In light of the efficiency benefits tie-ins frequently confer, attempts 
to regulate instances of tying that do not involve substantial tied market 
foreclosure but may nonetheless facilitate price discrimination would 
entail significant error costs. And, of course, attempts to constrain error 
costs by identifying those relatively uncommon tie-ins that do not en-
hance static efficiency would create significant decision costs. To mini-
mize the sum of decision and error costs, then, the Court should hold 
that tie-ins not involving substantial tied market foreclosure are legal 
even if they may facilitate price discrimination. Coupled with its consis-
tent adherence to decision-theoretic principles, the Court’s observation 
in Independent Ink that price discrimination is common in competitive 
markets suggests that the Court is headed in this direction.339 
B. Loyalty Rebates 
 A loyalty rebate occurs when a seller grants a price cut on all units 
a buyer has purchased from it, once the buyer purchases some speci-
 
336 See id. Even Elhauge, perhaps the leading academic defender of current tying doc-
trine, concedes that most metering tie-ins will increase output in the tying product market 
and enhance total surplus. See id. at 433, 481. 
337 See Klein & Wiley, supra note 180, at 612–15 (explaining why the static efficiency ef-
fects of metering price discrimination are likely to be positive). 
338 Id. at 615–19 (explaining why metering price discrimination is likely to promote 
dynamic efficiency). 
339 See infra notes 172–175 and accompanying text. 
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fied quantity of units.340 Frequently, the quantity requirement is set 
forth in terms of a percentage of the buyer’s requirements.341 Because 
they involve price cuts, loyalty rebates always provide consumer benefit 
in the short run.342 One might thus expect them to be evaluated under 
the straightforward standards articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
1993 decision, Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.343 
Some scholars have argued, though, that loyalty rebates may occasion 
anticompetitive harm even if they result in above-cost pricing.344 Ac-
cordingly, those scholars contend, they should be evaluated under a 
more nuanced liability rule.345 
 The harm these scholars predict occurs when the discount at issue 
enables the discounter to usurp so much business from its rivals that 
their output drops below minimum efficient scale.346 Assume, for ex-
ample, that a market consists of two brands, that the current market 
share of the brands, which reflects consumer demand, is 60% for the 
dominant brand and 40% for its nondominant rival. Assume also that 
the product at issue costs each manufacturer $.90 per unit to produce, 
that it is sold by each to retailers for $1 per unit, and that minimum 
efficient scale in this market occurs at a level of production equal to 
35% of market demand. Suppose, then, that the dominant manufac-
turer offers retailers a 10% loyalty rebate on all purchases ever made if 
they buy 70% of their requirements from that manufacturer. The $0.90 
per unit discounted price is not below the dominant manufacturer’s 
cost and thus would not run afoul of Brooke Group. 
 Such a loyalty rebate, however, could cause anticompetitive harm 
by driving an equally efficient rival from the market.347 That is because 
the non-dominant rival could avoid losing market share and thus fal-
                                                                                                                      
340 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 333, at 106. 
341 See id. 
342 See id. 
343 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–24 
(1993) (establishing a standard of illegality only where the discounted per unit price is 
below cost and there is a likelihood of recoupment via supracompetitive pricing). 
344 See Robert H. Lande, Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, 
2006 Utah L. Rev. 863, 865; Willard K. Tom et al., Anticompetitive Aspects of Market-Share 
Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67 Antitrust L.J. 615, 627 (2000). See 
generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 333, at 107 (summarizing potential anticompeti-
tive effects of loyalty rebates). 
345 See Lande, supra note 344, at 882–83; Tom et al., supra note 344, at 638. 
346 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 333, at 107; Areeda et al., supra note 169, 
¶ 749b (recognizing that there may be situations in which an above-cost single-product 
discount “increases the dominant firm’s sales so much that it denies rivals economies of 
scale because they cannot get their own output high enough”). 
347 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 333, at 107. 
2011] The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust 933 
ling below minimum efficient scale only if it matched the full dollar 
amount of the dominant brand’s discount on its smaller base of 
sales.348 Such a smaller producer, however, would not be able to match 
without pricing below its cost.349 
                                                                                                                     
 Given the potential for this sort of scenario, a number of commen-
tators have argued that Brooke Group’s safe harbor for above-cost dis-
counts should not apply to loyalty rebates.350 For example, during their 
time at the Federal Trade Commission, Willard Tom, David Balto, and 
Neil Averitt asserted that “the cost test of predatory pricing does not 
automatically apply” to loyalty rebates.351 Instead, they maintained, 
“one must conduct a case-by-case analysis of the actual effects of the 
particular practice to determine whether anticompetitive outcomes are 
likely.”352 
 From the standpoint of decision theory, though, straightforward 
application of the Brooke Group safe harbor for loyalty rebates that result 
in above-cost prices is a far wiser course. As an initial matter, any rival that 
is as efficient as the discounter and engages in aggressive price competi-
tion from the outset can avoid being foreclosed by a loyalty rebate that 
does not result in below-cost discounted prices.353 All it must do is main-
tain its price at or near the level of its marginal cost.354 
 
 
348 See id. 
349 Consider, for example, a typical retailer that initially (before the rebate announce-
ment) satisfied its requirements by purchasing sixty units of the dominant brand for $60 
and forty units of the rival for $40. After implementation of the rebate plan, the retailer 
could meet its requirements by spending $63 to obtain seventy units of the dominant 
brand and $30 to obtain thirty units of the rival’s brand. In order to prevent a loss of mar-
ket share that would drive it below minimum efficient scale, the nondominant manufac-
turer would need to match the dominant seller’s $7 discount. But to do so, it would have 
to lower its $1 per-unit price by 17.5 cents ($.175 * 40 = $7.00), which would require it to 
price below its cost of $.90 per unit. 
350 See Lande, supra note 344, at 869, 882–83; Tom et al., supra note 344, at 638. 
351 Tom et al., supra note 344, at 638. When their article was published, Tom, Balto, 
and Averitt were, respectively, the deputy director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, the 
bureau’s assistant director for policy and evaluation, and an attorney within the bureau. Id. 
at 615. 
352 Id. at 638. 
353 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion, 2006 Utah L. Rev. 841, 845–49. 
As Hovenkamp explains: 
[W]hen a discount is offered on a single product (whether a quantity or mar-
ket share discount) the discount should be lawful if the price, after all dis-
counts are taken into account, exceeds the defendant’s marginal cost or aver-
age variable cost because such discounts are covered by antitrust’s ordinary 
predatory pricing rule. One of the factors driving the predatory pricing rule 
is that, as long as prices are above the relevant measure of cost, the discounts 
934 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:871 
 Moreover, the sort of case-by-case analysis urged by those who hy-
pothesize instances of anticompetitive loyalty rebates would involve ex-
tremely high decision and error costs. Such an approach would require 
a court to ascertain minimum efficient scale within a market and to de-
termine whether the discount at issue would tend to drive the output of 
rivals below that level.355 Such determinations are extremely difficult to 
make, requiring extensive discovery and expert testimony.356 False con-
victions would be inevitable, and businesses that anticipated such errors 
and possible treble damage awards would be discouraged from giving 
any rebates that might be subject to challenge.357 Consumer welfare 
would suffer. 
                                                                                                                      
cannot exclude an equally efficient rival. The same is true of single product 
discounts. 
Id. at 844. 
354 In the hypothetical above, for example, the dominant firm’s discounted price, $.90 
per unit, was equal to both firms’ cost of production. Had the nondominant rival charged 
that price prior to implementation of the dominant firm’s loyalty rebate, it likely would 
have grown its market share to a point at which its rival’s loyalty rebate strategy could not 
drive it below minimum efficient scale. Moreover, a strategy that would prevent a nondo-
minant but equally efficient firm from being harmed by a dominant rival’s above-cost loy-
alty rebate would be for the non-dominant firm to give its own loyalty (i.e., volume) dis-
counts from the outset, securing up-front commitments from enough buyers (in exchange 
for discounted prices) to ensure that its production stayed above minimum efficient scale. 
Such a strategy, which would obviously benefit consumers, would be encouraged by a rule 
that evaluated loyalty rebates under straightforward Brooke Group principles and thereby 
signaled to manufacturers that they must take steps to protect themselves from above-cost 
loyalty rebates. See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222--24. In the end, then, any equally efficient 
rival that is committed to engaging in vigorous price competition ought not to be ex-
cluded by a dominant seller’s above-cost loyalty rebate. 
355 Hovenkamp, supra note 353, at 843. 
356 See id. (observing that the approach would “make impossible informational de-
mands on courts”). 
357 Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1688, 1709–10 
(2005). As the author has explained elsewhere: 
The problem with this open-ended approach, of course, is that it offers virtu-
ally no guidance to businesses. In practice, it would require antitrust counsel-
ors to predict whether a judge (or, worse yet, a jury) would conclude that an 
above-cost purchase target discount was merely “competition on the merits” 
or was likely to be so successful (i.e., to win so much business from rivals) that 
it would harm competition by reducing rivals’ efficiencies. The crystal ball na-
ture of this inquiry, coupled with the fact that a mistaken prediction could re-
sult in treble damages, would likely overdeter by chilling many proconsumer 
discounts. 
Id; see also Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253, 
266–67 (2003) (“These sorts of risks [created by open-ended liability rules] cannot help 
but chill investments to create product offerings with a sufficient quality or cost advantage 
over preexisting market options . . . .”). 
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 In a challenge to loyalty rebates, then, the Roberts Court would 
confront several considerations relevant to a decision-theoretic analysis. 
First, an above-cost loyalty rebate is unlikely to foreclose or impair the 
efficiency of any equally efficient rival that engages in aggressive price 
competition. Second, any anticompetitive harm that does result is likely 
to self correct as supracompetitive pricing attracts new entrants into the 
market. Third, efforts to capture any stray instances of such harm would 
be costly to administer and would likely chill procompetitive price re-
ductions. In light of those considerations, the approach that would 
cause the least harm and minimize the sum of decision and error costs 
would be to evaluate loyalty rebates under straightforward Brooke Group 
principles, immunizing those rebates that result in above-cost prices. 
That is the tack the Roberts Court would likely take on loyalty rebates. 
C. Bundled Discounts 
 Like loyalty rebates, bundled discounts are conditional price 
cuts.358 They occur when a seller offers discounts on the condition that 
buyers purchase from the seller multiple products from different prod-
uct markets.359 They, too, generally provide immediate consumer bene-
fit, so courts should use caution regulating them.360 But bundled dis-
counts differ from loyalty rebates in that they do have the potential to 
exclude equally efficient, aggressive rivals, even if they result in above-
cost prices. Nonetheless, decision theory suggests there should be a 
price-cost safe harbor for bundled discounts. 
 As a number of courts and commentators have explained, a bun-
dled discount that results in an above-cost price for the bundle may ex-
clude from the market an equally efficient rival that does not produce 
as diverse a product line as the discounter. Such a rival would have to 
match the entire dollar value of the bundled discount on its less exten-
                                                                                                                      
358 See Lambert, supra note 357, at 1689. 
359 See id. 
360 See id. at 1698. Einer Elhauge has argued that bundled discounts need not provide 
any consumer benefit at all. See Elhauge, supra note 48, at 450–51. He hypothesizes a situa-
tion in which the seller first raises the unbundled price above the amount it would charge 
absent the discount (i.e., above the “but for” price) and then “discounts” the bundle to a 
price at or above the aggregate price that would have prevailed absent the bundled dis-
count scheme. See id. Although such phony discounts are theoretically possible, Elhauge 
points to no empirical evidence suggesting that they are common (or that they exist at all 
in the real world). See id. As the author has argued elsewhere, the sort of phony discount 
that so worries Elhauge would be relatively easy to identify, so courts could exempt them 
from any generally prevailing approach to evaluating bundled discounts. See Lambert, 
supra note 357, at 1753–55. 
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sive product line.361 The classic example of the problem involves a 
bundled discount on shampoo and conditioner.362 Suppose that manu-
facturer A sells both shampoo and conditioner, is a monopolist in the 
conditioner market, and competes in the shampoo market against 
manufacturer B, which sells only shampoo. B is the more efficient 
shampoo manufacturer, producing shampoo at a cost of $1.25 per bot-
tle compared to A’s cost of $1.50 per bottle. A’s cost of producing a bot-
tle of conditioner is $2.50. If purchased separately, A’s per-bottle prices 
for shampoo and conditioner are $2.00 and $4.00, respectively. But A 
offers customers a $1.00 bundled discount, charging only $5.00 for the 
shampoo/conditioner package. 
 Although this discounted price is still above A’s cost for the bundle 
($4.00), it could tend to exclude B. Assuming that shampoo buyers 
must also buy conditioner (in equal proportions), buyers would have to 
pay A’s unbundled conditioner price of $4.00 if they purchased B ’s 
shampoo and would thus be unwilling to pay more than $1.00 for the B 
brand of shampoo. That price, though, is below B ’s $1.25 cost. Thus, 
A’s bundled discount would tend to exclude B from the market even 
though the discounted price ($5.00) is above A’s aggregate cost for the 
bundle ($4.00) and B is the more efficient shampoo producer. 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized in 2003 
in LePage’s Inc. v. 3M that a bundled discount “when offered by a mo-
nopolist . . . may foreclose portions of the market to a potential com-
petitor who does not manufacture an equally diverse group of products 
and who therefore cannot make a comparable offer.”363 Sitting en banc, 
the court famously condemned a bundled discount program by defen-
dant 3M using this reasoning.364 The court upheld a $68 million anti-
trust judgment in favor of 3M’s rival, LePage’s, even though the dis-
counted prices 3M offered were above its costs and LePage’s conceded 
that it was a less efficient producer of the products it sold in competition 
with 3M.365 The court’s evaluative approach was hardly a model of clar-
                                                                                                                      
361 See LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2003); Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. 
v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra 
note 333, at 96; Lambert, supra note 357, at 1695–96. 
362 See Ortho, 920 F. Supp. at 467 (setting forth a version of the hypothetical presented 
in the text above, albeit with slightly altered price and cost data). 
363 LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 155. 
364 Id. at 155--57. 
365 Id. at 157, 177 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). 
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ity and included no safe harbors for sellers contemplating bundled dis-
count offers.366 Not surprisingly, the business community was aghast.367 
 In contrast to the Third Circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit has crafted a clear safe harbor for certain bundled dis-
counts. In 2008’s Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, the Ninth Cir-
cuit adopted a safe harbor based on a “discount attribution” test.368 
Under that court’s approach, liability will not arise when a bundled dis-
count results in above-cost pricing of a competitive product after the 
entire amount of the discount is attributed to that product.369 If a bun-
dled discount passes muster under that test, then any equally efficient 
single-product seller of the competitive product could match the dis-
count. The only sellers that would lose sales because of that discount 
would be either those less efficient than the bundled discounter, or 
those unwilling to lower price to the level of cost. Competition is not 
harmed when rivals that are less efficient or less willing to compete are 
excluded from the market. 
 Compared to the Third Circuit’s amorphous approach, the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach reduces error costs by eliminating the potential for 
liability based on discounts that could not impair competition.370 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s approach imposes relatively low decision 
costs on business planners, for, as the PeaceHealth court observed, “[a] 
seller can easily ascertain its own prices and costs of production and 
calculate whether its discounting practices run afoul of the rule we 
have outlined.”371 
                                                                                                                      
366 See Lambert, supra note 357, at 1720–21 (parsing the reasoning of the LePage’s deci-
sion to discern the court’s evaluative approach). The LePage’s court appeared to hold that 
(1) bundled discounts are presumptively exclusionary if the discounter is bundling prod-
ucts not sold by its rivals and is winning business from those rivals, but (2) the presump-
tion may be rebutted if the discounter proves a “business reasons justification” for the 
bundled discounts, meaning that the bundling saves costs approaching the amount of the 
total discount. See id. 
367 See Mike Meyers, One Big, Sticky Mess, Star Trib. (Minneapolis), Nov. 10, 2003, at 
D1 (“[C]ompanies nationwide are glued to the case.”). The following businesses and trade 
groups joined amicus briefs asking the Supreme Court to reverse the decision: BellSouth 
Corp.; Boeing Co.; Brunswick Corp.; the Business Roundtable; Caterpillar Inc.; the Coca-
Cola Co.; Eastman Kodak Co.; Honeywell International Inc.; Hormel Foods Corp.; Intel 
Corp.; Johnson & Johnson, Inc.; Kimberly-Clark Corp.; Morgan Stanley; the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers; Nokia Inc.; Northwest Airlines, Inc.; the Procter & Gamble Co.; 
Schering-Plough Corp.; Staples, Inc.; Verizon Communications; and Xerox Corp. See Lam-
bert, supra note 357, at 1690 n.7. 
368 515 F.3d 883, 906 (9th Cir. 2008). 
369 Id. 
370 Id. 
371 Id. at 907. 
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 From a decision-theoretic perspective, then, the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach to evaluating bundled discounts is far superior to that fol-
lowed by the Third Circuit. At a minimum, the Roberts Court, if it de-
cides to resolve the current circuit split on how to evaluate bundled 
discounts, will likely endorse the discount attribution safe harbor. It 
may go further, immunizing bundled discounts that result in an above-
cost price for the bundle itself, or requiring a plaintiff to prove either 
below-cost pricing of the entire bundle or its equivalent efficiency and 
likelihood of exclusion.372 The downside of the former approach is that 
it may create significant error costs from false negatives because of the 
fact that above-cost bundled discounts may exclude efficient, competi-
tive rivals.373 The downside of the latter approach is that it imposes 
high decision costs on courts as well as business planners, who must es-
timate their rivals’ efficiencies.374 Either approach may optimally mini-
mize the sum of decision and error costs, and the Roberts Court would 
certainly take a hard look at both.375 The author has elsewhere sug-
gested an alternative approach that avoids both difficulties and would 
keep decision and error costs in check.376 Certainly the author would 
be pleased if the Court were to adopt the proposal. This Article’s focus, 
though, is prediction, and the Article predicts with confidence that the 
Roberts Court, if called upon to prescribe a liability rule for bundled 
discounts, will, at a minimum, provide a safe harbor for discounts that 
are above-cost under the discount attribution test. 
                                                                                                                     
Conclusion 
 Judge Harold Leventhal famously compared examinations of legis-
lative history to looking across a crowded room in search of one’s 
friends; in both inquiries, one is sure to find what one is looking for.377 
 
372 See id. at 904–05; Lambert, supra note 357, at 1700–05. This is the so-called “aggre-
gate discount” rule. See PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d at 904–05; Lambert, supra note 357, at 1700–
05. Herbert Hovenkamp endorses this approach, on decision-theoretic grounds, in his 
own scholarship, although not in his Antitrust Law treatise. See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, 
at 172–73. This is the approach endorsed by the Ortho court. See Ortho, 920 F. Supp. at 469. 
373 See Lambert, supra note 357, at 1705 (describing potential error costs of aggregate 
discount approach). 
374 See id. at 1729–30 (describing the high administrative costs of the Ortho rule). 
375 See Lambert, supra note 264, at 175–77 (explaining how discount aggregation rule, 
although potentially underdeterrent, may nonetheless be optimal from the standpoint of 
decision theory). 
376 See Lambert, supra note 357, at 1739–53. 
377 Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme 
Court Term, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 195, 214 (1983) (recounting Judge Leventhal’s observation 
about legislative history). 
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ow-
er.
more “modest” enter-
prise, have moved the law in a salutary direction. 
                                                                                                                     
The same can no doubt be said of endeavors to analyze the jurispru-
dence of a “Court” that begins in a somewhat arbitrary fashion upon a 
new chief justice’s confirmation and that is also constantly changing. 
When it comes to the Roberts Court’s antitrust decisions, scholars sym-
pathetic to the Chicago School have discerned trends reflective of that 
school’s insights and methodologies.378 Scholars associated with the 
Harvard School have done the same.379 The trend identified in this 
Article, a recognition of the limits of antitrust and a consequent effort 
to structure liability rules so as to minimize the sum of decision and 
error costs, is an old friend of mine.380 Accordingly, I cannot rule out 
the possibility that I have seen in these decisions just what I wanted to 
see. The degree to which the Roberts Court’s antitrust decisions often 
quite explicitly comport with decision theory’s insights is striking, h
ev  
 In any event, this Article’s analysis has debunked the oft-heard 
characterization of the Roberts Court’s antitrust jurisprudence as being 
reflexively pro-business, anti-consumer, and “radical.” That meme is 
overly simplistic and betrays both a severe naivety about the inherent 
limits of the antitrust enterprise and a misunderstanding of the inten-
tionally evolutionary nature of antitrust doctrine. In light of antitrust’s 
limits, which must be respected if the body of law is to provide maxi-
mum long-term benefit to consumers, the Roberts Court’s antitrust de-
cisions, although generally rendering antitrust a 
 
378 See Wright, supra note 1, at 26. 
379 See Elhauge, supra note 1, at 60. 
380 See Lambert, supra note 56, at 224; Lambert, supra note 45, at 2004--05. This ap-
proach is sometimes called a “Neo-Chicago” approach. See Daniel Crane, Chicago, Post-
Chicago, Neo-Chicago, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1911, 1932--33 (2009) (describing a “Neo-Chicago” 
approach that would “rearticulat[e] [the Chicago School’s] second article of faith,” by 
emphasizing that “competitive practices that cause harm cannot be controlled without 
doing damage to similar competitive practices that do good” and that “the good that 
would be chilled through aggressive antitrust enforcement is often greater than the bad 
that would be prevented”); David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for 
Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73, 85 (2005) (set-
ting forth an error cost approach to crafting rules governing unilateral practices). 
Note, though, that some scholars have disputed whether there is a real difference be-
tween the Neo-Chicago approach and the traditional Chicago School approach as empha-
sized by such lions of the Chicago School as Judge Easterbrook. See Josh Wright, Neo-
Chicago Meets Evidence-Based Antitrust, Truth on the Market (May 12, 2009), http:// 
truthonthemarket.com/2009/05/12/neo-chicago-meets-evidence-based-antitrust/. 
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